State of Utah vs. Sonja  Swanson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
State of Utah vs. Sonja Swanson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
R. Clayton Huntsman; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Sonja Le Swanson, No. 930160 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5033
DOCKET KO. 1301W 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 930160-CA 
APPEAL from the Fifth District Court, 
in and for Washington County, Utah, 
Hon. James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court Judge 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION: Rule 29(b)(15), Utah R.App.P, 
Criminal matter/Defendant not incarcerated 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
23 6 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
R. Clayton Huntsman 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
P.O. Box 1425 [Preferred 
mailing] 
Office: 2 West St. George Blvd. 
Tower Bldg., Suite 31 
Ancestor Square 
St. George, Utah 8477 0 
FILED 
CEC 23 1993 
COURT Of APPEALS 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN - 1600 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (801) 628-2846 
Fax NO.: (801) 628-3049 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
SONJA SWANSON 
Defendant and Appellant 
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Comes now R. Clayton Huntsman, counsel for defendant-
appellant, and files the following Errata sheet correcting errors 
in Brief of Appellant (hereafter "Brief") filed December 20, 1993. 
1. On p. 4 of Brief, under "E". PUBLISHED ETHICAL 
OPINIONS. . . .": Opinion 34 is cited on page 23 in Brief, as well as 
attached in Addendum. 
2. On p. 35, there should be a comma after "underpayment." 
Also "Kalkaesque" (sic) should be "Kafkaesque." 
ORIGINAL 
l 
3. On p. 43 "rape" should be "abuse." 
Respectfully submitted this d a y o f 
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Jan Graham 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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AttorHley for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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IV. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT; 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence entered 
in a state district court in Utah. Accordingly, the Utah Court of 
Appeal has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2 ((f) ) . 
However, because of the nature of this case, and the broad 
scope of remedy sought, and for other good cause, Appellant has 
respectfully suggested that the Utah Court of Appeals may desire to 
certify this case to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to U.C.A. 
4 
§78-2a-3(3), as amended. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW, WITH AUTHORITY. 
A. ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant's right to the undivided loyalty of 
counsel was jeopardized because of her appointed counsel's 
relationship as "of counsel" and "office sharing" with, and 
functional integration into, a lawfirm, both in fact and as held 
out to the public, when that lawfirm prosecutes city cases in Utah, 
defends criminal cases in Utah, and has a senior partner who is a 
county commissioner with powers over both defendant's prosecutor as 
well that same partner's "of counsel" lawfirm member, i.e. 
defendant's appointed attorney who is on contract with that same 
county as public defender. 
2. Whether defendant In fact received ineffective assistance 
of counsel in not being allowed to possess or even read her own 
discovery after several requests, in being "rushed through" the 
local criminal justice system without being allowed participation 
herself, and/or in being told to plead guilty straight-up to a 
second-degree felony by her appointed legal counsel while she was 
in an overcrowded jail sleeping on the floor next to a common 
toilet, if she wanted to be released, and whether this 
action/inaction constitutes ineffective representation of counsel, 
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and if so, 
(a) does it provide grounds for reversal of conviction and 
sentence, either independently or taken together with the 
other Brown-related conflict of interest issues raised here, 
and 
(b) whether per se reversal is even appropriate, given the 
hostile and interconflicting system of criminal justice in 
Washington County, and whether a final judgment of dismissal 
with prejudice by the appellate court might not be a more 
appropriate and just remedy than reversal and remand. 
3. Whether defendant or anyone else should rely solely on 
unpaid volunteer activist legal counsel to represent her when 
Washington County has a statutory duty to assure the undivided 
loyalty of defense counsel for the indigent, and which counsel 
Washington County has refused to provide, and if Washington has 
refused to provide undivided loyalty of defense counsel, forcing 
indigent defendants to find other counsel, 
(a) whether all citizens similarly situated should be 
entitled to automatic reversal or dismissal with prejudice or 
some other remedy as a class, since Washington County and its 
agents were well aware of the per-se reversal warnings in 
Brown several months ago and refused to comply, requiring 
wronged defendants to undergo even further injustice, and 
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(b) Whether as a matter of public policy, to deter similar 
conduct and/or to remedy defendant's position, Washington 
County and or the State of Utah, which forced this indigent 
defendant in a felony case to obtain loyal counsel when the 
county flatly refused to do so even after notice in Brown, 
supra, should not be ordered to pay appellant's counsel 
attorneys fees for his representation of her in this case. 
4. Whether the following general order, or one similar to it, 
from the Utah Supreme Court under its inherent supervisory powers, 
should be promulgated now to provide proper guidance to courts and 
counsel, and to further the ends of justice; that general order 
reading as follows, or substantially similar thereto: 
(a) "An attorney who is employed by or on contract with any 
state government or agency or subdivision thereof, or holding 
any elective or appointed office, whether paid or unpaid, in 
any state government or subdivision thereof, in any capacity, 
shall not defend any person accused of a crime, particularly 
the indigent, who have no choice in the selection of their 
legal counsel", and 
(b) "What an attorney cannot do, neither can that attorney's 
partner, associate, "of counsel" designee, office-sharer, 
"tenant", "landlord" or anyone else associated with that 
attorney in a way which presents any conflict of interest, 
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however slight, whether potential or actual, or even in 
appearance, in assuring the undivided loyalty to one accused 
of a crime". 
5. In light of the difficulty this defendant will have in 
receiving a fair trial and due process and in light of the refusal 
of the criminal justice system in Washington County to act in good 
faith to date to correct itself, even well after notice of State v. 
Brown, supra, whether the appropriate remedy on appeal should be 
dismissal of all criminal charges with prejudice and on the merits, 
rather than remand for a new trial in a hostile, prejudicial, and 
unjust environment. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW [For this type of case a simply-
phrased response such as "plain error" does not apply]. 
All issues above involve claim of 6th and 14th Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel. According to State v. 
Garrett, 207 Utah Adv.Rep 45 (filed in the Utah Ct.App. Feb. 
26, 1993), P.2d. , defendant must show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness" and "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." Cited also 
are Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984) and State y^_ Tempi in, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990). 
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Further, upon such claim the appellate court must 
"indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance," i.e., "overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances the challenged action [or inaction?] >might be 
considered sound trial strategy'." ["or inaction?" added]. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104S.Ct. at 2065 (etc.). See 
also Tempiin, supra, 805 P.2d. at 186. If defendant can show 
"that counsel's actions were NOT conscious trial strategy," 
[emphasis added] then the appellate court can find "deficient 
performance." This Court must be persuaded that defendant's 
trial counsel's actions [or inaction] lacked "any conceivable 
tactical basis" before reversing on an ineffectiveness claim. 
State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989). 
This Court must also be persuaded that trial counsel's 
deficient performance, if any, actually prejudiced the 
defendant. Defendant must show this Court that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 
A record for review was made in the instant case in a 
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lengthy probable cause hearing to stay punishment and sentence 
pending appeal. New counsel is also of record. 
However, an additional and perhaps far more significant 
and applicable "standard of review" analysis in this most 
unusual case is that found in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 at 
856-57: 
Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public 
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power 
over the Courts...[we reverse]. 
Also Brown. supra. at 857 presents an even better 
standard for review of post-Brown cases, where, as here, 
counties and prosecutors and defense counsel are and have been 
on notice at least since November 30, 1992, and certainly is 
applicable in the instant case, which arose January 13, 1993, 
well after Brownfs publication: 
Because a concrete showing of prejudice would be 
very difficult to make when a prosecutor is appointed to 
assist in the defense of an accused, we conclude that it 
is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case 
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, we announce 
a per se rule of reversal whenever such dual 
representation is undertaken so as to prevent its 
recurrence. rEmphasis added]. 
It is this per-se rule that appears clearly designed to 
get the attention of those who just don't "get it"—i.e., who 
fail to see the connection between the serious underlying 
abuse of conflicting interests and the resulting injustice, 
whether from conscious or unconscious actions, arising out of 
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those conflicts of interest. This standard of review ought to 
be the one applied on all five issues raised here, 
particularly Nos. 3, 4, and 5 above, which are intended to 
encourage this Court to apply meaningful remedies, to put 
"teeth11 in to the per se rule in Brown, and to meaningfully 
deter the blatant ignoring or sidestepping of Brown in the 
future as well as during the very recent past. A "bright-
line" rule, or an order granting attorneys fees, and dismissal 
with prejudice (rather than reversal and remand to a hostile 
justice system) are especially amenable to the powers of the 
Utah Supreme Court to regulate courts and attorneys, and 
therefore the Brown standard of review, with expansions noted 
above, should be the standard applied in all issues raised 
above, particularly in 3, 4, and 5 
VI. VERBATIM STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
1. UNITED STATES CONST, amend VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
2. UNITED STATES CONST, amend X: 
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The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people. 
3. UNITED STATES CONST, amend XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
B. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
1. CONST. OF UTAH Article I §7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
2. CONST. OF UTAH Article I §12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy pubic trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
3. CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme 
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Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters 
to be exercised as provided by statute, and the power to issue 
all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme 
Courtfs jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause. 
4. CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §4: 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by 
rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired 
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in 
Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
C. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-1 et sea. 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by 
each county, city and town for the defense of indigent persons 
in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative 
bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces 
the substantial probability of the deprivation of his 
liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal 
counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities 
necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and 
prosecuting of other remedies before or after a 
conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in 
the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
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2. UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-2 et seq 
Due to length this section is respectfully reproduced in the 
Addendum to this brief, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) and 24(f), Utah 
R.App.P., in App. I-A, infra. 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-7-5: 
Every court has authority to: 
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council. 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-51-30: 
An attorney who directly or indirectly advises in 
relation to, or aids or promotes the defense of, any action or 
proceeding in any court, the prosecution of which is carried 
on, aided or promoted by a person as public prosecutor with 
whom such attorney is directly or indirectly connected as a 
partner, or who, having himself prosecuted or in any manner 
aided or promoted any action or proceeding in any court as 
public prosecutor, afterwards directly or indirectly advises 
in relation to, or takes any part in, the defense thereof as 
an attorney or otherwise; or who takes or receives any 
valuable consideration from or on behalf of any defendant in 
any such action upon any understanding or agreement whatever, 
express or implied, relating to the defense thereof, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly, and his 
license to practice may be revoked or suspended. 
5. UTAH CODE ANN. §17-18-1(9)(a): 
A county attorney may not (a) jjn any manner consult, 
advise, counsel, or defend within this state any person 
charged with a crime, misdemeanor, or breach of any penal 
statute or ordinance; [Emphasis added]. 
6. UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-4(3)(4)(5): 
Improperly disclosing or using private, controlled, or 
protected information—Using position to secure privileges or 
exemptions—Accepting employment which would impair 
independence of judgment or ethical performance. 
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(3) use or attempt to use his official position to secure 
special privileges or exemptions for himself or others; 
(4) accept other employment which he might expect would 
impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his 
public duties; or 
(5) accept other employment which he might expect would 
interfere with the ethical performance of his public duties. 
7. UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-5(1)(a)(b): 
(1) No public officer or public employee shall knowingly 
receive, accept, take, seek, or solicit, directly or 
indirectly, any gift, compensation, or loan for himself or 
another if: 
(a) it tends to influence him in the discharge of his 
official duties; or 
(b) he recently has been, or is now, or in the near 
future may be involved in any governmental action 
directly affecting the donor or lender, unless a 
disclosure of the gift, compensation, or loan and other 
relevant information has been made in the manner provided 
in Section 67-16-6. 
8. UTAH CODE ANN. §67-16-9. 
No public officer or public employee shall have personal 
investments in any business entity which will create a 
substantial conflict between his private interests and his 
public duties. 
D. RULES 
1. UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 605: 
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that 
trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to 
preserve the point. 
2. UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
(a) Rule 8(a): 
A defendant charged with a public offense has the 
right to self-representation, and if indigent has the 
right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces 
a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. 
(b) Rule 16(a) 
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(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendants; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilty of the accused, mitigate the guilty of 
the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available 
to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(c) Rule 22 
(Copied, in Addendum) I-B, infra. 
(d) Rule 25(a) 
In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either put its own 
initiative or upon application of either party order an 
information or indictment dismissed. 
3. UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(a) Rule 43: 
(Copied in Addendum) 
(b) Rule 30(b) 
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial 
shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a 
judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, 
the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
[Emphasis added]. 
4. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-605: 
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Unpublished opinions, orders, and judgments have no 
precedential value and shall not be cited or used in the 
courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the 
doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral 
estoppel. 
5. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
(a) Rule 1.3 Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client. 
(b) Rule 1.4 Communication 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation. 
(c) Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule. 
[Copied in Addendum]. 
(d) Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them 
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them 
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. [Emphasis added]. 
(e) 2.1. Advisor. 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment.... 
(f) Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor. 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused 
has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for 
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable 
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opportunity to obtain counsel. 
(g) Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory 
Lawyer. 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over 
another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: 
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the 
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in 
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and 
knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails 
to take reasonable remedial action. 
(h) Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer. 
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the 
direction of another person. 
(i) Rule 7.2 Advertising. 
[Cited in Addendum]. 
(j) Rule 7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads. 
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a 
partnership or other organization only when that is the 
fact. [Emphasis added]. 
G. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
Court Below: 
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This is a criminal case. Defendant-Appellant Sonja Swanson 
was arrested in hr own home by five armed policemen pursuant to a 
search warrant. Officers claim controlled substances were found in 
her home. 
Defendant-Appellant Swanson was charged with the second-degree 
felony offense of "possession of controlled substances, to wit: 
methamphetamines, with intent to distribute,ft a second-degree 
felony. Swanson was jailed forthwith. 
On January 14, 1993, Defendant-Appellant Swanson appeared 
before Hon. James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court Judge in and for 
Washington County, State of Utah. After an inquiry Judge Shumate 
found her indigent and appointed Washington County Public Defender 
J. MacArthur Wright to represent her. 
On January 19, 1993, Defendant-Appellant allegedly waived her 
rights to a preliminary hearing and a bindover order was issued. 
Only then was she released from custody at the women!s tank of the 
Washington County Jail1, where she had been held continuously since 
*0n November 11, 1993, Washington County settled a class-action 
lawsuit with Defendant-Appellant Sonja Swanson as one named 
plaintiff. The suit was brought, and settled in plaintiff's favor, 
because of unconstitutional overcrowding and other wrongs suffered 
by women ordered into the Washington County Jail, including many, 
like Ms. Swanson, who had not even been convicted of anything, but 
who were only being detained because of indigency or otherwise 
unable to meet bail. See, Christina Lynn Stucki and Sonja Swanson, 
individually and on behalf of a group for inmates similarly 
situated. Plaintiffs, vs. Washington County, a government entity: 
Glenwood Humphries, Washington County Sheriff; Jon Neighbor, 
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her arrest. She pleaded guilty, "straight-up," to the second-
degree felony, pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement she entered 
into while incarcerated in an illegally over-crowded jail. 
On March 3, 1993, Ms, Swanson was sentenced to 60 days jail in 
the same illegal facility, with 3 0 days stayed upon her receiving 
substance abuse counselling. Judgment was executed on March 5, 
1993. 
On March 4, 1993, Defendant-Appellant, through new (present) 
counsel, filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause 
staying punishment during the appeal. The Probable Cause hearing 
commenced March 5, 1993, continued over several days, and was 
granted on March 12, 1993. It was executed and filed by the trial 
court on March 17, 1993. 
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 4, 1993. However, since 
judgment was not executed and filed until March 5, 1993, nor ever 
copied to Defendant-Appellantfs new counsel, who appeared on March 
4, 1993, an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on March 18, 1993, 
as soon as new counsel was able to determine whether, when, and 
where judgment had been placed. 
Docketing statement was filed on April 5, 1993. Several 
Undersheriff; Russell J. Gallian, Washington County Commissioner; 
Gayle M. Aldred, Washington County Commissioner; Jerry B. Lewis, 
Washington County Commissioner; John Doe I through John Doe X, Case 
No. 93-C-527G, United States District Court, District of Utah, 
Central Division. 
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requests since were made to Washington County to transmit the 
entire record. After the Court Administrator was finally 
contacted, seven months after the docketing statement was filed, 
the record was apparently transmitted, and briefing notices issued. 
H. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 13, 1993, defendant was arrested in her home by 
five armed officers pursuant to a search warrant. March 5 Tr. 
15:17-16:2 and March 8 Tr. 62:16-63:14. She was immediately read 
her Miranda (March 8 Tr. 71:25-72:3 and 63:15-25) warning before 
she was fully awake and was not allowed to dress. March 8 Tr. 
65:10-18 and 73:3-6; March 5 Tr. 15-19-25. She felt vulnerable, 
exposed and terrified. March 8 Tr. 64:12-65-20. She was afraid 
for her young daughter's well being. March 5 Tr. 17:3 0-19. 
Officers claimed to have found a small amount of methamphetamine in 
her purse March 5 Tr. 16:1-2 and 22:4-8 which was at Ms. Swanson's 
home. .Id. She was arrested and the next day, after inquiry, was 
found to be indigent. March 5 Tr. 17:24-18:1. J. MacArthur 
Wright, who has a contract with Washington County to represent the 
indigent accused, (March 8 Tr. 9:2-4 and March 8 Tr 33:7-8 and 
March 12 Tr. 36: 23-37:2) was appointed to represent her. Id. and 
March 12 Tr. 36:20-22. 
J. MacArthur Wright has held himself out to the public 
variously as an associate or as "of counsel11 with the law firm of 
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Gallian, Westfall, and Wilcox (GWW). See Defendants Exhibit 1, 
"Telephone Book", and March 8 Tr. 13:17-15:4. Mr. Russ Gallian, 
senior partner of GWW, has been town attorney for the Town of 
Ivins, Utah, March 8 Tr. 83:14-16 and with John Hummel, an 
associate in GWW, has prosecuted city cases there at all material 
times herein. March 8 Tr. 83:22-84:5 and March 12 Tr. 29.1; Tr. 
28:18-29:9 and 49:8-50:14. The same John Hummel has been on 
contract with Kanab City, Utah, as public defender for the indigent 
accused since January 1, 1992 to the present. March 12 Tr. 29:16-
23. Further, the same Mr. Gallian has been, at all material times 
herein, a Washington County Commissioner with budgetary and other 
administrative functions and oversight with the Washington County 
Attorneys Office, (March 8 Tr. 93:19-25; 94:8-25), the public 
defender, (March 8:Tr.91-19-24 Tr. 85:6-20) the jail (March 8 
Tr:95:l-3), the sherifffs office, (March 8 Tr. 95:2-6) and 
virtually all other aspects of the local criminal justice system. 
Id. Exhibits and testimony showed that Mr. Wright has had his 
photograph published in telephone advertising directories with the 
partners and associates of GWW, sometimes with a tiny "of counsel" 
designation, and sometimes not even that. Exhibit; March 8 Tr. 
13:17-15:4. Further, Mr. Wright and Commissioner Gallian 
testified that they share the same telephone number, (March 8 Tr. 
95:17) the same office suite (with only the designation of 
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"Gallian, Westfall and Wilcox" on the entrances); (March 8 Tr. 
16:7-11 and Tr. 15:5-8) secretaries who are privy to mutual 
confidences; (March 8 Tr. 9:22-2 5) computers which interface; 
(March 8 Tr. 22:11-13); and in all other material respects share a 
unified practice, (March 12 Tr. 39:5-12), including Commissioner 
Gallian's collecting a percentage of Mr. Wright's civil fees (March 
8 Tr. 97:20-23 and 103: 17-22, and 83:8-13). Both Commissioner 
Gallian and Mr. Wright admitted that their relationship has been, 
at all material times hereto, at least one of office sharing. 
March 8 Tr. 96:19-23 and 21:24-22:4 The same district court judge 
in an identical post-Brown case ruled that Gallian and Wright had 
an "office sharing relationship". March 8 Tr. 96:13-15 (Emphasis 
added). This was before Utah State Bar Counsel Steve Trost 
testified that "office sharing" violated Brown. Testimony of Steve 
Trost, Bar Counsel suggested that the designation "of counsel" is 
even more proximate to associate or partner status than it is to 
"office sharing". March 12 Tr. 19:24-20:2 and March 8 Tr 88:16-22. 
Steve Trost, Utah State Bar Counsel, testified as an expert witness 
that since State v. Brown (2 01 Utah Adv.Rep.4 Nov. 30, 1992) was 
decided under the Utah Supreme Court's inherent supervisory power 
over the courts, and since published Opinion 3 4 of the Utah State 
Bar and the Code of Professional Ethics are also promulgated in 
furtherance thereof, that the Brown policy and rule clearly applies 
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not only to individuals with concurrent prosecutorial and criminal 
defense functions but to partners, associates, and those who office 
share. March 12 Tr. 21:3-25:21. 
Further, defendant Sonja Swanson testified that her attorney 
was too busy to provide effective counsel; (March 8 Tr. 53:8-9); 
refused to give her copies of her own alleged confessions or any 
other discovery even when requested (March 5 Tr. 19:7-20; March 8 
Tr. 44:19-45:5; see also Tr. 58:1-4); and told her (in effect) 
"they've got you—just plead guilty", and then speeded her through 
the system. March 5 Tr. 19:21-24. Mr. Wright himself testified 
under oath that "it was my policy not to give [a police report of 
defendant's own statement to them] to [the accused] except in 
unusual circumstances...." March 8 Tr. 44:19-24 and 45:2-5. 
After the initial Notice of Appeal was filed, a Certificate of 
Probable Cause hearing was held before the District Court. March 
5, 8 & 12 Trs. in toto. That court appeared from the beginning to 
be antagonistic to defendant and predisposed to view the evidence 
wherever possible to avoid the uncomfortable proximity of Brown. 
It cross-examined defendant sua sponte in ways which counsel 
ethically could not, such as asking her if she did not in fact 
serve jail time for an unrelated DUI several years before March 8 
Tr. 77:5-25. [Defendant responded admirably that she had, and 
that the Washington County jail was as overcrowded then as it is 
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now and that she had to sleep on the floor next to a toilet then as 
well as now]• March 8 Tr. 78:1-5. The Court at first refused to 
take Opinion 34 seriously, saying to defendant's counsel "as you 
well know, if it [Opinion 34] is based in 1976, the entire Rules of 
Professional Conduct for attorneys were substantially revamped in 
the late 1980 fs". March 8 Tr. 25:19-26:18. But when Mr. Trost 
testified that Opinion 34 was indeed current and reliable, the 
Court reached to make findings of "fact" which so contradicts and 
distorts the evidence presented and even its own previous holding 
in a virtually identical unpublished case it cited on the record 
that to a reasonable person it appears to be an as an abuse of 
discretion [i.e., finding "only a rental arrangement, not office 
sharing", March 12 Tr. 38:1-8 despite evidence to the contrary and 
admissions to the contrary by even Mr. Wright and Commissioner 
Gallian themselves], and a prior ruling in an unpublished case the 
court referred to called "Frausto" raising identical issues by the 
same Court that the Gallian-Wright relationship was in fact office 
sharing. March 12 Tr. 96:14-15 and March 12 Tr. 19:24-20.2; March 
8 Tr. 88:16-22; March 12 Tr 42:14-43:3. The court even suggested 
it evaded a consistent holding of "office sharing" in the instant 
case because of Mr. Trostfs clear testimony that "office sharing" 
was a conflict of interest. March 12 Tr. 44:6-10. The Court also 
referred to its own office sharing—rental—situation in years 
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past—an irrelevant and defendant believes improper, biased, and 
personal insertion into the case, particularly in combination with 
abuse of discretion in findings and in proceedings elsewhere on 
several occasions. March 12 Tr. 43:4-22. The Court's conduct is 
relevant in this fact statement because the remedy sought on appeal 
takes into account the difficulty of the Washington County justice 
system, as now constituted, to provide a fair trial or meaningful 
due process upon reversal and remand, because of an inability of 
key elements in that system to objectively recognize the tangled 
conflicts of interest, and the resulting injustice, existing 
locally. This is especially so even after the Brown decision was 
published on November 30, 1992. Also, due to an inextricable, 
easily correctable, but stubbornly maintained web of conflicts of 
interest, in fact as well as in the chilling appearances thereof, 
even a reversal and remand would not provide defendant substantial 
justice under the circumstances. 
I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant-Appellant was denied her right to the undivided 
loyalty of counsel because her court-appointed public defender was 
an associate of, or was "of counsel" to, or at least "office 
shared" with, and was functionally integrated into a lawfirm which 
simultaneously prosecuted criminal cases in Utah and whose senior 
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partner is a county commissioner whose senior partner is a county 
commissioner (one of three) with supervisory and/or budgetary 
powers over the public defender himself, over defendant's 
prosecutor over her jail, over the sheriff's office, and virtually 
every other aspect of the Washington County criminal justice 
system, and who, under contract, shared fees with defendant's 
court-appointed public defender. 
The other two public defenders did not oppose this 
arrangement, and one in fact even sent letters supporting the 
status quo. No other attorney, qualified or otherwise was 
appointed or solicited to represent defendant-appellant Sonja 
Swanson, who was thus left with no effective, conflict-free public 
defender whatsoever. Further, the legal system in Washington 
County seemed to view Brown, supra, as something to be side-stepped 
with impunity. 
2. The public defender defendant-appellant had was 
ineffective. He appeared rushed and "too busy" to consult with 
defendant. He refused, even after several requests, to copy her 
with the most crucial discovery, including an alleged statement of 
self-incrimination and police reports. He simply came to defendant 
and said "They've got you—just plead guilty [straight-up]", which 
she could have done by herself. Defendant-appellant was thus 
denied her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective 
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assistance of counsel. 
3. Appellate counsel and counsel for the ACLU of Utah were 
required, at no offered compensation, to step into the vacuum 
created by the above-described corrupt state of affairs, or no 
justice whatsoever would have been even attempted. Said counsel 
were denied legal fees even though the trial court found defendant 
indigent. This court should award attorneys fees where the county 
fails to provide conflict-free effective counsel, and not leave 
public defender duties up to the volunteers while insider-appointed 
and maintained "public defenders11 get paid for being ineffective. 
4. The Supreme Court, through its rulemaking powers and 
inherent authority under the Constitution of Utah, should spell out 
clearly the full scope of Brown-related conflicts, as much as 
possible and as suggested in this brief, in a general Order or Rule 
so that state and local governments and their employees and 
contract attorneys will not manipulate, evade, or sidestep Brown 
over the years but will be held strictly accountable for Brown 
violations. 
5. The appellate court should put some enforcement "teeth" 
into its prior rulings by dismissing this prosecution, and others 
like it, on the merits and with prejudice. A reversal and remand 
to an uncooperative justice system which appears to be contemptuous 
of Brown, bar rulings, and of this very Court's inherent powers, 
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would have only a "paper tiger" effect and would cause the Supreme 
Court of Utah to lose respect and effectiveness. It would also 
subject the already victimized Appellant to retaliation and even 
more abuse. 
This Court must seriously "get the attention" of our local 
governments, including some of the rural ones who are hundreds of 
miles from appellate enforcement, federal review, and meaningful 
oversight. Interlocking conflicts of interest and "good ole boy" 
justice should be meaningfully discouraged. Unfortunately, high 
ideals suggested from afar often do not seem to penetrate in 
Washington County. What does make for constructive change will 
require financial incentives and permanently lost cases. Immediate 
and real incentives to Washington County and not at the expense of 
an already victimized defendant should be ordered here today. 
J. ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE UNDIVIDED LOYALTY OF COUNSEL 
It is axiomatic that defendants in felony criminal 
prosecutions are entitled to the assistance of counsel (Gideon v. 
Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) as well as to effective assistance 
of counsel (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983) ) , and see 
also J-2 of this brief. To deny same is to deny a defendant his 
rights as guaranteed in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
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United States Constitution. Id. 
One of two fundamental aspects of effective representation 
involves undivided loyalty of counsel. In Covles v. Sullivan, 44 6 
U.S. 335 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the divided 
loyalty of counsel constitutes prima facia evidence of 
ineffectiveness. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a conflict of interest 
involving counsel in a criminal case requires per se reversal. 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). The Brown court held 
that a part-time prosecutor doing criminal defense constituted an 
inherent conflict of interest. 
Brown relied on the Supreme Court's inherent supervisory 
powers over the courts and on public policy: 
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally 
impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial 
responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we 
conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system 
are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist 
in the defense of an accused. Consequently, we hold that as 
a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent 
supervisory power over the courts, counsel with concurrent 
prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend 
indigent persons; therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction 
and order a new trial. 
Id. at 856-57. 
Supporting the Court's concern for the integrity of the 
criminal justice system, and inherent in it, is legislation passed 
by elected representatives and signed by an elected governor—to 
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wit, Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1(4), which cites as but one of the 
minimum standards to be provided by each county for the defense of 
indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts that said county 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client. 
To some extent, whether an indigent accused of a felony has 
the undivided loyalty of her counsel is a question of fact. 
However, where, as in the instant case, a clear conflict of 
interest arises by virtue of membership or in association with or 
integration into a lawfirm which prosecutes crimes and whose senior 
partner has supervisory power over the prosecutor, jail, sheriff's 
office, and public defender selection and retention and salary and 
benefits, and same is established by competent and even clear and 
convincing evidence, the question of undivided loyalty becomes one 
of law, logic, ethics, and Supreme Court regulation. 
Consider, for example, Utah Code Ann. 78-51-3 0, cited fully 
supra at 15. Here, an attorney who directly or indirectly advises 
or defends, or aids in the defense where the prosecutor is directly 
or indirectly connected as a partner, is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and "shall be punished accordingly, and his license to practice may 
be revoked or suspended." Id. In the case at bar, no one is 
suggesting that Mr. Wright or Mr. Gallian or anyone else be 
personally punished in any way. But the intent of this statute, 
particularly when taken in context with Brown, supra, underscores 
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the sensitivity of conflicts precisely as they exist here. While 
some argument may be made that Gallian and Wright are not 
"partners," they certainly had no hesitation in holding themselves 
out to the public as a functionally integrated lawfirm, with shared 
secretaries, interfacing computers, and presumably shared 
confidences. They even share civil fees (at least) . Please see H-
2, ("Statement of Facts") above, and record for the full layout of 
functional integration, which is far too lengthy to be re-recited 
here. 
These conflicts are even more patently offensive when U.C.A. 
§67-16-4(3)(4), and (5) are considered in this context, involving 
use of official positions or employment which interferes with the 
ethical performance of public duties. Please see p. 16, supra. 
Other issues involving conflict of interest in this whole 
relationship involve taking gifts or compensation if "it tends to 
influence him in the discharge of his official duties, or is or may 
be involved in governmental action directly affecting the donor or 
lender...." See U.C.A. §67-16-5(1)(a) and (b), set out more fully 
at p. 16 , supra. Further, 
No public officer or public employee shall have personal 
investments in any business entity which will create a 
substantial conflict between his private interests and his 
public duties. 
U.C.A. §67-16-9. 
The integration and fee sharing between Commissioner Gallian 
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and Public Defender Wright is hardly an arms-length relationship or 
one free from the corruption and conflict set forth above and 
elsewhere. It is hardly a "rental" relationship, but one which for 
months has corrupted justice in Washington County and which assured 
Sonja Swanson, defendant-appellant herein, of the divided attention 
and virtually no loyalty in her "defense" whatsoever. 
Further, ethical prohibitions against Brown violations by 
lawfirm members have been in effect at all material times and 
virtually ignored in the Washington County justice system. See, 
e.g., Rule Prof. Conduct 1.10(a): 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them 
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them 
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2. [Emphasis added]. 
Rule 1.7 is the general conflict of interest rule, and is cited in 
full at 18 herein. 
In short, Commissioner Gallian could not have defended Sonja 
Swanson because he prosecuted criminal cases in the city of Ivins, 
Utah. His associate, John Hummel, simultaneously prosecuted in 
Ivins as well and defended as Kanab public defender, even well 
after Brown was published. Clearly, neither of them could have 
represented Sonja Swanson. And since MacArthur Wright held himself 
out to the public as a part of a firm, shared telephone, offices, 
secretaries, computer system, and admitted to being at least in an 
office-sharing situation, he could not and should not have 
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represented Sonia Swanson either. And this logical conclusion does 
not even consider the geometrically compounded complications and 
conflicts arising when, added to the above, one takes into account 
Commissioner Gallian's control and influence over prosecution, 
police, jail, and public defender selection and retention by virtue 
of his elected position in county government. Nor does it factor 
in the fact that Mr. Wright did not even attempt to defend Ms. 
Swanson with any vigor, preferring, apparently, to "roll over" and 
make life easier for everyone in the system,—except Sonja Swanson-
-by telling her to plead guilty and not let her have copies of her 
own discovery for her own review and consideration. 
There is much more that can be said here but space limitations 
forbid. Please see entire sections of cited law from Part F, 
supra, pgs. 12-19, which further support the proposition that Ms. 
Swanson was denied the undivided loyalty of her counsel, and that 
both Washington County and her defender knew of that breach or 
should have known, but ignored Brown, Rule 1.10, and other 
authority, even though they were well aware of it. 
2 . DEFENDANT-APPELLANTf S APPOINTED PUBLIC DEFENDER WAS WHOLLY 
INEFFECTIVE. IN LIGHT OF HIS INABILITY TO PROVIDE UNDIVIDED LOYALTY 
AND BECAUSE OF HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO ZEALOUSLY DEFEND HER. 
For the criminal justice system to work, and to have 
34 
credibility with the public and to provide true due process, both 
sides, particularly the defense, must engage in vigorous 
adversarial examination of fact and argument of law. 
When the defense simply accedes to prosecution charges, 
whether from underpayment overwork, weariness, boredom, or dislike 
of accused persons, or any other reason, due process is denied, the 
adversarial system is cheated, and, worse of all, the defendant is 
sucked through an assembly-line processing, into a Kalkaesque 
nightmare. 
It is to avoid this evil that Gideon, supra, held that "any 
person hauled into court, who is too poor to have a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. 
But a mere "right to counsel" rings hollow unless that counsel is 
minimally effective. 
The landmark case of Strickland v. Washington, supra. held 
"that a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial 
alongside the accused is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
command." Effectiveness in Strickland thus appears to be defined 
by "what is reasonable under prevailing professional norms". Jd at 
688. 
As stated in D-2, supra, ineffectiveness occurs when counsel's 
representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
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In the instant case, defendant-appellant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. At the Probable Cause hearing, (See, for 
citations to the record, "Facts," p. 25, supra), Appellant 
testified that her attorney was too busy to provide effective 
counsel; always seemed rushed; refused, even after several 
requests, to give her even a copy of her own alleged confessions, 
or any other discovery. See U.C.A. §77-1-6. He told her "they've 
got you—just plead guilty," then speeded her through the system. 
Her lawyer even testified under oath that "it was my policy not to 
give [a police report of defendant's own stcitement to police] to an 
accused, except in unusual circumstances...." He even suggested 
that police reports and other discovery were somehow 
"confidential," thus precluding the accused from seeing any 
discovery pertaining to her own case. 
While Appellant was being so "defended" she was confined, 
without having been found guilty, in an illegal, overcrowded jail, 
sleeping on the floor next to a common toilet. She was confused, 
anxious over the welfare of her small daughter, was not 
sophisticated in the intricacies of criminal defense, either 
procedurally or substantively, and was terrified. She therefore 
submitted to whatever her attorney said, including the lame refusal 
to provide copies of her statements to police [she has since stated 
that a substantial difference arose over what she was told was in 
36 
the reports and what she actually read for herself in them]. 
Ms. Swanson then pleaded straight-up to a second-degree 
felony, even though she had several good defenses which could have 
at least been tested, and even though she had no significant 
criminal record. Had Appellant gone to trial even without any 
lawyer she would have been no worse off. She still would have a 
second-degree felony, and maybe less, but in no event more. And it 
is doubtful that after a presentence investigation she would have 
gone to prison or done any substantial jail time. 
3. WASHINGTON COUNTY WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE WHOLLY 
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT; 
SINCE IT REFUSED TO DO SO, HAVING FIRST FOUND APPELLANT INDIGENT, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SHOULD PAY REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES FOR THE 
COUNSEL SHE DID CONVINCE TO ACCEPT HER CASE WITHOUT PAYMENT FROM 
HER. 
Appellant incorporates arguments in J-2 and J-3 above into 
this section in support of the propositions that Washington County 
refused to provide either wholly independent or effective counsel 
for Appellant at any time. Further, Appellant incorporates the 
same arguments here in support of the proposition that Washington 
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County had duties arising from statute, State and Federal 
Constitutions, bar ethics, public policy, and Supreme Court mandate 
based on inherent powers to provide conflict-free, independent, 
competent, and reasonably zealous counsel to assist Appellant in 
her defense of a serious felony charge. 
Appellant respectfully suggests that it would appear to be 
just and within this Courtfs inherent powers to award attorneys 
fees for the services of her counsel in (a) challenging an unjust 
conviction; (b) successfully obtaining a Certificate of Probable 
Cause in her behalf, and (c) appealing these issues to higher 
courts. 
There already exists statutory authority in support of the 
proposition that Washington County must provide such counsel (see, 
e.g. , U.C.A. §77-32-1 and §7-32-2 (effective April 27, 1992). 
Present counsel requested attorneys fees already from the District 
Court, and same was denied. See Addendum, App. 3, "Order Denying 
Attorneys Fees". U.C.A. §77-27-56 authorizes attorneys fees in 
civil cases, and UrCivP 81(e) authorizes application of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure to criminal cases. 
Further, U.C.A. §77-32-2(1) is not limited to district courts 
for two reasons: (1) "the court on its own motion or otherwise" 
may order counsel appointed for an indigent accused. There is no 
reason to believe that "the court" is limited only to inferior 
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courts; (2) It appears to be logical and reasonable to accept the 
proposition that an appellate court is not less able than a 
district court to exercise either its inherent authority pursuant 
to CONST. OF UTAH Art VIII §§3 and 4, or under statute, such as 
§77-32-2. Please see p. 14 of this brief, supra, for Art. VIII §§3 
and 4 in full. 
If there was ever a compelling reason for a court to appoint 
counsel under §77-32-2(c)(iii), then it is in this case. First of 
all, such an order appears "necessary for the exercise of 
the... complete determination of any cause." Id, §3 [emphasis 
added]. 
Why is such an order necessary? Because, as a matter of 
common sense and practical, realistic administration of justice, 
the legal system simply cannot be expected to rely fully on public 
interest or pro bono lawyers, working for no fees whatsoever, to 
meet the compelling demands of a competent and conflict-free 
defense of those accused of felonies. It is unreasonable and 
unjust to permit payment of fees to public defenders who do not 
defend effectively or render undivided loyalty to their clients and 
at the same time to deny such fees to those who actually do so 
defend, where those paid have refused to. A train of de facto 
free public defenders of those whom the justice system tramples 
over should not be a substitute for just compensation for defender 
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services. 
Washington County did not offer Ms. Swanson any alternatives. 
This situation is not one where an indigent accused rejects an 
appointed attorney and says, "I desire Mr. or Ms. X, a prominent 
defense attorney, to represent me at county expense, not my 
assigned public defender." Rather, this is a case where absolutely 
nobody, except for the ACLU and present counsel, were willing to 
become involved at all and to try to undo the damage her previously 
appointed counsel wreaked, particularly invoking the costs, risks, 
and retaliations which are always inherent in such actions. 
Further, it is not unreasonable to assume that for each case 
like the instant one where new counsel intervened, that there are 
many, many more where "roll-over" justice is the norm, and the 
routine. It therefore would serve a valid public policy objective 
to give counties the incentive to provide a decent public defender 
structure by making it more costly for them to be unjust than it is 
to be just, at least where helpless indigents accused of felonies 
are involved. 
Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
order Washington County to pay her attorneys fees in bringing this 
appeal, as well as for the Certificate of Probable Cause, which 
would not have been sought, and therefore not granted, absent new 
counsels• intervention. 
40 
4. COUNTIES AND CITIES AS WELL AS PUBLIC DEFENDERS, NEED A 
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL "BRIGHT LINE" RULE WHERE CONFLICTS OF 
INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED, 
In the instant case, both Brown, supra, CPR Rule 1.10, supra, 
and other law and rule prohibiting the conduct and conflicts of 
interest complained of here were in effect and wholly disregarded 
by the Washington County justice system. Local governments should 
not be stubbornly non-cooperative in providing effective and 
conflict-free public defenders. 
One way that this court can get the attention of rural justice 
systems in Utah is to expand the scope of Brown, by Supreme Court 
Order, to integrate into one order that which is now scattered 
throughout the legal landscape in various statutes, cases, ethical 
opinions, and CPRs. 
It is respectfully suggested that the Court make the following 
order or one substantially similar to it, violation of which will 
result in automatic per se reversal and dismissal of criminal 
cases: 
(a) "An attorney who is employed by or on contract with any 
statement government or agency or subdivision thereof, or holding 
any elective or appointed office, whether paid or unpaid, in any 
state government or subdivision thereof, in any capacity, shall not 
defend any person accused of a crime, particularly the indigent, 
who have no choice in the selection of their legal counsel". 
(b) "What an attorney cannot do, neither can that attorney's 
partner, associate, of counsel designee, office-sharer, tenant, 
landlord, or anyone else associated with that attorney in a way 
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which presents any conflict of interest, however slight, whether 
potential or actual, or even in appearance, in assuring the 
undivided loyalty to one accused of a crime". 
With such an order, the system of justice in Utah might be 
delivered in a more clearly understandable manner, with less 
contempt for defendants1 rights under law, and without the chronic 
and blatant ignoring and sidestepping of fundamental due process as 
guaranteed in the Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution as well as Sections 7 and 12 of Article I of 
the Utah Constitution. 
The possibility that meaningful justice might be more costly 
should not be as much of a concern as the protection of inalienable 
rights of our citizenry. Nor should those presumed innocent be 
tossed aside as "nobodies" and given contemptuous legal 
representation in some effort to save a few dollars, or for any 
other reason. 
5. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER APPELLANTS CRIMINAL CHARGES 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS HERE AND NOW, RATHER 
THAN REMANDING HER BACK TO A HOSTILE. AND VINDICTIVE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
WHICH HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED A STUBBORN RESISTANCE TO PROVIDING 
APPELLANT WITH FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS. 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should not 
merely reverse and remand Ms. Swanson's case back to Washington 
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County. Ms. Swanson has already suffered enough. She has been 
confined in an illegally overcrowded jail, forced to "sleep" on the 
floor next to a common toilet (see "Facts", at 19, supra) , been 
railroaded through a system unwilling to provide her with even the 
most rudimentary due process, and harassed by a hostile district 
court judge in ways set forth, with transcript support, above. 
Simply because Ms. Swanson1s home was invaded by five armed men, 
who kept her virtually naked during inquisition and who claimed to 
have found a small amount of controlled substances in her purse, 
and just because Ms. Swanson was then jailed, provided with a 
conflict-ridden legal counsel who treated her with contempt, 
indifference, and ineffectiveness does not justify putting her 
through the grinder again. This is not just a situation where "a 
criminal goes free because the constable bungled." We have here 
not one officer's "bungle," as with a Miranda violation, perhaps, 
but an entire system, from Judge to prosecutor to public defender 
to voyeuristic arresting officers, who did more than "bungle". 
Rather, individually and as a whole, they did wilfully and 
contemptuously rape due process and rendered cruel and unusual 
punishment to one assumed to be innocent. The only meaningful 
remedy for Sonja Swanson, Appellant herein, is dismissal here and 
now of all her charges, with prejudice and on the merits. Then 
perhaps the next potential victim of "Dixie justice" will not be so 
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abused. This Court has that inherent power under U.C.A. §78-2-2(2) 
and (3), particularly (3), and Art. VIII §§3 & 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
K. CONCLUSION 
There is an alarming trend which has taken place over the past 
decade or more in our country, in the rural areas particularly, 
which are reminiscent of the proverbial "southern justice." While 
it may be too much to ask this Court in this case to right all of 
the wrongs in all rural justice systems in Utah, this Court can and 
must get the attention of the one before it, i.e., the Washington 
County justice system. This Court can do so by granting the 
specific remedies set forth above and hereby prayed for in summary 
form: 
1. Finding that Appellant was denied wholly independent 
counsel in the District Court; reversal of her conviction, and 
dismissal by this Court of her prosecution on the merits and with 
prejudice; 
2. Finding that Appellant was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel, particularly in the context of his conflicts of 
interest; that same was harmful to her and fell below the standard 
of care required in Strickland and elsewhere; reversal of her 
conviction therefore and dismissal of her prosecution on the merits 
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and with prejudice; 
3. Attorneys fees and costs of court for her present counsel, 
including the additional assistance rendered by the ACLU; 
4. An order clarifying the scope of Brown and related 
conflicts of interest in providing defense to indigents accused of 
felonies. A proposed two-part order is set forth above, which 
Appellant requests be promulgated by the Court in substantially 
similar form; 
5. Such other and further relief as this Court deems 
appropriate and proper, both in fashioning a full range of remedies 
for Appellant as well as in correcting abuses in the justice 
system, and particularly involving the public defender system in 
Washington County and throughout Utah. / 
Respectfully submitted this day of < > u ^ y ^ , 
1993. 
R^CLAYJON 4i(ll^ T^ MAN 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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77-32-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 32 








Minimum standards provided by 
county for defense of indigent de-
fendants. 
Assignment of counsel on request of 
defendant or order of court. 
Duties of assigned counsel — Com-
pensation. 
Time for determination of indigency. 
Expenses of printing briefs, deposi-





Governing bodies of counties or mu-
nicipalities to appoint counsel or 
provide through legal aid associa-
tions. 
Expenditures of county or municipal 
funds declared proper — Tax levy 
authorized. 
Pro bono criminal representation — 
Liability limits. 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for de-
fense of indigent defendants. 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city 
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts 
and various administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a com-
plete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of 
other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending 
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch. 
52, § 1. 
Cross-Rsferences. — Criminal lineup, 
right to have attorney present, § 77-8-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appointment of counsel. 
—-Judicial act. 
Attorney for allegedly insane person. 
City ordinance violations. 
Compensation. 
Denial of counsel in city court. 
Federal court intervention. 
Federal court proceedings. 
Inapplicable to hearing for parole revocation. 
Necessity for investigator. 
Payment of investigator by county. 
Petition to county for appointment of investi-
gator. 
Appointment of counsel. 
—Judicial act 
The placement of this section in Title 77 
rather than Title 78 indicates that it is not 
designed to change the inherently judicial act 
of appointing counsel. Edwards v. Hare, 682 F. 
Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
A judge's actions in carrying out the power 
to appoint counsel and set bail, including the 
mechanics of obtaining counsel, are judicial; 
thus where the court was unable to locate 
counsel, its decision to accept accused's plea 
without his having counsel was judicial, and 
any purported failure to carry out a responsi-
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biiity to obtain counsel and set appropriate bail 
was protected by absolute immunity. Edwards 
v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
Attorney for allegedly insane person. 
An attorney appointed by court to represent 
allegedly insane person, under separate stat-
ute providing that court appoint counsel to rep-
resent patient in involuntary proceeding to de-
termine sanity, was not entitled to recover 
claim against county. Bedford v. Salt Lake 
County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968). 
City ordinance violations. 
Couny did not have duty to pay for legal 
counsel assigned by city courts to represent 
persons charged with city ordinance violations. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 520 
P.2d 211 (Utah 1974). 
Compensation. 
Statute was mandatory but if county made 
no arrangements for representation of indigent 
defendants in criminal cases, court could ap-
point counsel but court had no authority to or-
der county to pay attorney so appointed. Wash-
ington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 
189 (1968). 
Denial of counsel in city court 
Where indigent was not provided with coun-
sel in city court hearing on Nevada extradition 
request, but was subsequently provided with 
counsel in order to make application to the dis-
trict court for writ of habeas corpus, his rights 
were not prejudiced since he had full opportu-
nity, with the aid of counsel, to present any 
matter relating to his extradition at the dis-
trict court habeas corpus hearing. Myers v. 
Hadley, 16 Utah 2d 405, 402 P.2d 701 (1965). 
Federal court intervention. 
Parolee who was charged in city court with 
misdemeanor, conviction on which could have 
resulted in his imprisonment for as long as sev-
enteen years and five months, was not entitled 
to federal court injunction against his prosecu-
tion without appointed counsel since he had an 
adequate remedy under state law, parole was a 
matter of grace, the claimed injury was not 
great, immediate and irreparable, and injunc-
tion would not satisfactorily eliminate danger 
to parole status. Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 
713 (10th Cir. 1972). 
Federal court proceedings. 
Counties of Utah were obligated to provide 
counsel for indigent defendants only in connec-
tion with proceedings in state courts and were 
not obligated to pay for counsel for indigents in 
subsequent actions in federal court. 
Lamoreaux v. Grand County, 28 Utah 2d 92, 
498 P.2d 659 (1972). 
Inapplicable to hearing for parole revoca-
tion. 
Parolee was not entitled to be provided coun-
sel at hearing on revocation of his parole since 
intent of legislature was to limit right of coun-
sel in matters subsequent to conviction and 
sentence to appeals, applications for writs of 
habeas corpus, and for writs of coram nobis — 
matters affecting guilt or innocence and fair-
ness of trials by which those ends were accom-
plished; it did not refer to revocation of paroles. 
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 
(1969). 
Necessity for investigator. 
District court order authorizing court-ap-
pointed counsel for defendant to employ inves-
tigator and requiring county to pay therefor 
could not be enforced where there was no rea-
sonable basis on which to justify appointment 
of investigator. Washington County v. Day, 22 
Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968). 
Denial of defendant's application for an in-
vestigator at public expense was not prejudi-
cial in the absence of a showing that an inves-
tigation would have helped to establish that he 
did not commit the homicide or that informa-
tion gained from an investigation of the defen-
dant's childhood would have aided physicians 
in their psychiatric examination of the defen-
dant. State v. Cote, 27 Utah 2d 24r492 P.2d 
986 (1972). 
Payment of Investigator by county. 
Once investigator had been properly ap-
pointed under statute and rendered services to, 
and incurred expenses in behalf of, accused in-
digent, he was entitled to be paid therefor by 
county and should have filed his claim under 
statutes providing for presentation of claims 
against county. Washington County v. Day, 22 
Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968). 
Petition to county for appointment of in-
vestigator. 
Court was without authority to order county 
to provide and pay for investigator appointed 
by the court, in absence of petition by counsel, 
whether appointed by county or by court, to 
county to appoint investigator. Washington 
County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 
(1968). 
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77-32-2 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v. Mitchell: 
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Coun-
sel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933. 
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitu-
tional Protection? Strickland v. Washington 
and National Standards for Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 
723. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 732-769, 809, 810, 976-997. 
A.L.R. — Accused's right to assistance of 
counsel at or prior to arraignment, 5 A.L.R.3d 
1269. 
Circumstance giving rise to conflict of inter-
est between or among criminal codefendants 
precluding representation by same counsel, 34 
A.L.R.3d 470. 
Attorney's refusal to accept appointment to 
defend indigent, or to proceed in such defense, 
as contempt, 36 A.L.R.3d 1221. 
77-32-2. 
Right to assistance of counsel u 
to revoke probation, 44 A.L.R.3d ; 
Determination of indigency of i 
tling him to appointment of 
A.L.R.3d 1108. 
Accused's right to choose particularl 
appointed to assist him, 66 A.L.R.3d L 
Relief available for violation of right V< 
sel at sentencing in state criminal 
A.L.R.4th 183. ^ -
Right of indigent defendant in state c 
case to assistance of ballistics experts/^ 
A.L.R.4th 638. 
Right of indigent defendant in state < 
case to assistance of fingerprint expert^ 
A.L.R.4th 874. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal 
641-641.13. 
Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or 
order of court. "*^ S|i 
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is underl 
arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial probability5! 
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if:: (1) The defendant requests it; or ** 
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defen-
dant does not affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be 
represented. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 52, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
City ordinance violations. 
Misdemeanor charge. 
In general. 
This section is nothing more than a codifica-
tion of the constitutional rights to assistance of 
counsel and self-representation. State v. Laf-
ferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), affd, 776 
P.2d 631 (Utah 1989). 
City ordinance violations. 
County did not have duty to pay for legal 
counsel assigned by city courts to represent 
persons charged with city ordinance violations. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 520 
P.2d 211 (Utah 1974). 
Misdemeanor charge. 
Parolee who was charged in court with mis-
demeanor, conviction on which could have re-
sulted in his imprisonment for as long as sev-
enteen years and five months, was not entitled 
to federal court injunction against his prosecu-
tion without appointed counsel since he had an 
adequate remedy under state law, parole was a 
matter of grace, the claimed injury was not 
great, immediate and irreparable, and injunc-
tion would not satisfactorily eliminate danger 
to parole status. Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 
713 (10th Cir. 1972). 
While indigent accused in municipal court of 
misdemeanor with maximum six-month sen-
tence had right to counsel, he did not have con-
stitutional right to counsel at public expense. 
Hortencio v. Fillis, 25 Utah 2d 73, 475 P.2d 
1011 (1970), cert, denied 402 U.S. 966, 91 S. 
Ct. 1636, 29 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes assertion of right 
to counsel following Miranda warnings — fed-
eral cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation. 
(1) When representing an indigent person the assigned counsel shall: 
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the proceeding following 
assignment; and 
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other remedies before or after 
conviction that he considers to be in the interest of justice except for other 
and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section 
to represent an indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a 
discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first appeal of right to assure 
the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in 
the context of the appellate process of this state. 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant shall be entitled to com-
pensation upon the approval of the district court where the original trial was 
held, upon a showing that the defendant has been denied a constitutional 
right or that there was newly discovered evidence that would show the defen-
dant's innocence and that the legal services rendered by counsel were other 
than that required under this act or under a separate fee arrangement and 
were necessary for the indigent defendant and not for the purpose of delaying 
the judgment of the original trier of fact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1981, eh. 
77-32-4. Time for determination of indigency. 
The determination of indigency may be made by the court at any time. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-32-5. Expenses of printing briefs, depositions, and tran-
scripts. 
The expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first appeals of right on 
behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as depositions and other transcripts 
shall be paid by the state, county, or municipal agency that prosecuted the 
defendant at trial. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-5, enacted by L. ment, effective April 25,1988, inserted "state" 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 67, § 3; 1988, ch. before "county" and added "or municipal 
248, § 2. agency that prosecuted the defendant at trial" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- at the end of the section. 
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77-32-6 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-32-6. Governing bodies of counties or municipal!! 
appoint counsel or provide through legal a 
sociations. ~* 
Governing bodies of counties, cities and towns shall either 
(1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this \* 
ter by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding 
reasonable compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate i 
erning body; or 
(2) Arrange to provide those services through non-profit legal aidH 
other associations. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Claims against cities, 
§ 10-6-139. 
Claims against counties, § 17-15-10. 
Claims against towns, § 10-5-123. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
• 
Attorneys' claims for compensation. 
Reasonable compensation. 
Cited. 
Attorneys' claims for compensation. 
Attorneys' claim for services rendered m 
representing indigent criminal defendants 
should have been filed with the county, and 
appealed to a court if rejected by the county but 
should not have been filed directly in a district 
court. State v. Dixon, 22 Utah 2d 58, 448 P.2d 
716 (1968) 
County could not avoid its statutory duty to 
compensate attorneys appointed to represent^! 
indigent criminal defendant on appeal on!| 
ground that claim was not filed in strict accor^f 
dance with § 17-15-10. Hatch v. Weberi 
County, 23 Utah 2d 144, 459 P.2d 436 (1969)^ 
Reasonable compensation. ^t' 
Schedule allowing attorney $15 per hour for * 
m-court work and $10 per hour for out-of-court 
work plus reasonable expenses for represent-
ing indigent defendants was not arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or unreasonable Bennett v Davis 
County, 26 Utah 2d 225, 487 P.2d 1271 (1971) 
Cited m Edwards v Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 
(D Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
A.L.R. — Construction of state statutes pro-
viding for compensation of attorney for ser-
vices under appointment by court in defending 
indigent accused, 18 A.LR.3d 1074. 
77-32-7. Expenditures of county or municipal funds de-
clared proper — Tax levy authorized. 
All expenditures by the counties and the incorporated cities or towns which 
are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes defined in this chapter 
including donations to non-profit legal aid or other associations charged with 
the duty to provide the services are declared to be proper uses of public funds 
and the counties and incorporated areas of the state are authorized to levy and 
collect taxes for such purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-7, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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77-32-8. Pro bono criminal representation — Liability 
limits. 
Counsel assigned by a court to represent a person found indigent in crimi-
nal, post-conviction, or habeas corpus proceedings is immune from suit if he 
provides the legal services: 
(1) at no cost or for only a substantially reduced cost that is applied to 
but does not cover expenses of the service; and 
(2) without gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-8, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 99, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 












Restitution and costs — Con-
victed defendant may be re-
quired to pay 
Costs — What constitute. 
Ability to pay considered. 
Petition for remission of payment 
of costs. 
Time and method of payment. 
Payment as condition of probation 
or suspended sentence. 
Default m payment as contempt 
— Order to show cause — War-
rant of arrest. 
Default in payment as contempt 








Costs imposed on corporation or 
association — Duty to pay — 
Contempt. 
Imprisonment for contempt — 
Limitations. 
Default not constituting contempt 
— Relief allowed. 
Collection of payment in default 
— Execution. 
Docketing judgment for costs. 
Verified statement of time and ex-
penses of counsel for indigent 
defendants. 
77-32a-l. Restitution and costs — Convicted defendant 
may be required to pay. 
In a criminal action the court may require a convicted defendant to make 
restitution and pay costs. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-l, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Restitution to victims 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. of crime, § 76-3-201. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Testing C.J.S. — 20 CJ.S. Costs §§ 435-467 
the Limits of the Court's Exclusive Junsdic- A.L.R. — Institutional sentencing under 
tion in Fraud Cases: Discharge vs. Cnmmal Victim and Witness Protection Act § 5 (18 
Restitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rev 61. USCS §§ 3579, 3580), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 724. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs Key Numbers. — Costs *=» 284-325. 
T§ 100-112; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§§ 1036-1050. 
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77-32a-2. Costs — What constitute. 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state o r H 9 
political subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, including attorwfl 
fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant pursuant to Sectrai 
77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherenf^m 
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection 
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must M ! 
made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot! 
include attorneys' fees of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by thai 
prosecution for investigators or witnesses. ^ ^ 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-32a-3. Ability to pay considered. 
The court shall not include in the judgment a sentence that a defendant paj 
costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the 
amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take account of the 
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that pay-
ment of costs will impose and that restitution be the first priority. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-3, enacted by L. 
1980, eh. 15, § 2. 
77-32a-4. Petition for remission of payment of costs. 
A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in contu-
macious default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court 
which sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid 
portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of 
the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his imme-
diate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs, or 
modify the method of payment under Section 77-32a-5. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 460 
Key Numbers. — Costs «= 319. 
77-32a-5. Time and method of payment. 
When a defendant is sentenced to pay costs, the court may grant permission 
for payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified install-
ments. If no such permission is included m the sentence the costs shall be 
payable forthwith. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-32a-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs § 459. 
Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 318. 
77-32a-6. Payment as condition of probation or suspended 
sentence. 
When a defendant sentenced to pay costs is also placed on probation or 
imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make pay-
ment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity of requirement that, as 
condition of probation, indigent defendant re-
imburse defense costs, 79 A.L.R.3d 1025. 
77-32a-7. Default in payment as contempt — Order to 
show cause — Warrant of arrest. 
When a defendant sentenced to pay costs defaults in the payment thereof or 
of any installment, the court on motion of the attorney general or the county 
attorney or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his 
default should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue an order to 
show cause or a warrant of arrest for his appearance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-7, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Contempt, Chapter 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 32 of Title 78. 
77-32a-8. Default in payment as contempt — What consti-
tutes contempt — Imprisonment. 
Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an 
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to 
make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his 
default constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the costs or a 
specified part thereof, are paid. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur 2d Costs § 110, C.J.S. — 20 C.J S Costs § 464 
21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1049. Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 322. 
77-32a-9. Costs imposed on corporation or association — 
Duty to pay — Contempt. 
When costs are imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is 
the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the 
corporation or association to pay the costs from those assets, and his failure to 
do so may be held to be contempt unless he makes the showing required in 
Section 77-32a-8 of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-32a-10. Imprisonment for contempt — Limitations. 
The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of costs shall be set 
forth in the commitment order, and shall not exceed one day for each $25 of 
the costs, 30 days if the costs were imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor, 
or six months in the case of a felony, whichever is the shorter period. A person 
committed for nonpayment of costs shall be given credit toward payment for 
each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-10, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur.2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Costs § 110, C.J.S. — 20 C J S Costs § 464. 
21A Am Jur 2d Criminal Law § 1049 Key Numbers. — Costs e=> 322. 
77-32a-ll. Default not constituting contempt — Relief al-
lowed. 
If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment 
of costs is not contempt, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant 
additional time for payment, reducing the amount thereof or of each install-
ment or revoking the costs or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-ll, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-32a-12. Collection of payment in default — Execution. 
A default in the payment of costs or any installment thereof may be col-
lected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The 
levy of execution for the collection of costs shall not discharge a defendant 
committed to imprisonment for contempt until the amount of the costs has 
actually been collected. 
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History: C. 1953, 77-32a-12, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Execution to enforce 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. judgment, Rule 69, Rules of Civil Procedure 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur. 2d Costs § 110; C.J.S. — 20 C J S Costs §§ 461-463 
21A Am Jur 2d Criminal Law § 1049 Key Numbers. — Costs <s=> 320 
77-32a-13. Docketing judgment for costs. 
A judgment that the defendant pay costs may be docketed in the same 
manner as a judgment in a civil action. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-13, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-32a-14. Verified statement of time and expenses of 
counsel for indigent defendants. 
The court may require a verified statement of time and expenses from 
appointed counsel or the nonprofit legal aid or other association providing 
counsel to convicted indigent defendants in order to establish the costs, if any, 
which will be included in the judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-14, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
CHAPTER 33 
UNIFORM RENDITION OF PRISONERS 









Summoning prisoner in this state 
to testify in another state — 
Certificate of out-of-state judge 
Summoning prisoner in this state 
to testify in another state — 
Hearing — Issuance of order to 
attend. 
Summoning pnsoner in this state 
to testify in another state — Or-
der to provide for return, safe-
guards on custody, and pay-
ment of expenses. 
Rendition procedure inapplicable 
to person confined as insane or 








Prisoner m another state sum-
moned to testify in this state — 
Certificate of judge. 
Prisoner in another state sum-
moned to testify in this state — 
Order of compliance with terms 
and conditions prescribed by 
out-of-state judge. 
Exemption of pnsoner from an-
other state from arrest or ser-
vice of process. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Citation — Uniform Rendition of 
Prisoners as Witnesses in Crim-
inal Proceedings Act. 
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77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county ftiilBHS9H 
fense of indigent defendants. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
gent persons. This is a per se rule requiring 
reversal of the conviction when such a conflict 
occurs. State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
(1992). 
Cited in State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of indigent defendant in 
state criminal case to assistance of investiga-
tors, 81 A.L.R.4th 259. 
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or 
order of court. 
(1) Counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent person who is 
under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a substantial 
probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or 
prison if: 
(a) the defendant requests it; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defen-
dant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity 
to be represented. 
(2) (a) If the county, city, or town responsible to provide for the legal de-
fense of an indigent defendant has arranged by contract to provide those 
services and the court has received notice or a copy of such contract, the 
court shall appoint the contracting attorney as legal counsel to represent 
that defendant. 
(b) The court shall select and appoint the attorney or attorneys if: 
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attor-
neys; or 
(ii) the contract is with an additional attorney or attorneys in the 
event of a conflict of interest. 
(c) If the court considers the appointment of a noncontracting attorney 
to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of 
an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice of 
such contract, before the court may make the appointment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice to the attorney of the responsible county, 
city, or town of the hearing; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a 
noncontracting attorney. 
(d) The indigent defendant's mere preference for other counsel shall 






Counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obli-
gations may not be appointed to defend mdi-
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COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 77-32-6 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 27, 1992, designated the 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 52, § 2; 1992, ch. provisions of this section as Subsection (1) 
161, § 1. made related designation and stylistic changes 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- in that subsection, and added Subsection (2) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS probability that the penalty imposed would in 
elude a jail term was entitled to appointed 
City ordinance violations counsel at public expense City of St George v 
^
l t e d
 Smith, 181 Utah Adv Rep 69 (Ct App 1992) 
City ordinance violations.
 r , Q , r 
A criminal defendant charged with violating A;'lX*V* f* loaof 
a city ordinance where there was a substantial (Utah Ct App 1992) 
77-32-2.1. Hearing — Court to consider authorization or 
designation of facilities — Standard. 
(1) If a county, city, or town has contracted for or otherwise made arrange-
ments for the appropriate facilities necessary for a complete defense of an 
indigent defendant, including a competent investigator or investigators, the 
court shall conduct a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to 
consider the authorization or designation of noncontract facilities 
(2) The court shall make findings that there is a compelling reason to au-
thorize or designate a noncontractmg facility for the indigent defendant be-
fore it may authorize or designate the same 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-2.1, enacted by L. came effective on April 27, 1992 pursuant to 
1992, ch. 161, § 2. Utah Const, Art VI, § 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 161 be-
77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Merits of appeal. counsel or to refuse to appoint counsel on the 
It is for the appellate court, not counsel, to basis that appointed counsel did not believe a 
decide whether a case is wholly frivolous, thus, proposed appeal had merit Sandy City v 
it was error to allow withdrawal of appointed Brown, 827 P 2d 953 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
77-32-6. Governing bodies of counties or municipalities to 
appoint counsel or provide through legal aid as-
sociations. 
Governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns shall either 
(1) authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chap-
ter by appointing a qualified attorney m each case and awarding him 
reasonable compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate gov-
erning body, or 
(2) arrange by contract to provide those services through nonprofit le-
gal aid, other associations, or attorneys 
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History: C. 1953, 77-32-6, enacted by L. comma in the introductory language, and in-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1992, ch. 161, § 3. serted "by contract" and substituted "legal aid, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- other associations, or attorneys" for "legal aid 




77-32a-2 Costs — What constitute 
77-32a-2. Costs — What constitute. 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state or any 
political subdivision in investigating, searching for, apprehending, and prose-
cuting the defendant, including attorney fees of counsel assigned to represent 
the defendant pursuant to Section 77-32-2 and investigators' fees. Costs can-
not include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial 
or expenditures in connection with the maintenance and operation of govern-
ment agencies that must be made by the public irrespective of specific viola-
tions of law. Costs cannot include attorneys' fees for prosecuting attorneys. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L. the first sentence, deleted "or expenses m-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1993, ch. 238, § 1. curred by the prosecution for investigators or 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- witnesses" after "prosecuting attorneys" in the 
ment, effective May 3. 1993, inserted "investi- last sentence, and made stylistic changes 
gating, searching for, apprehending, and" in 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Investigation costs. could not have been assessed against defen-
The expense of an examination of a sexual dant as a cost, costs of investigation are mehgi-
assault victim was a cost incurred by the prose- ble for restitution State v Depaoli, L91 Utah 
cution in the course of the investigation and Adv Rep 3 (1992) 
before the filing of the criminal information. It 
77-32a-3. Ability to pay considered. 





Case was remanded for supplementary find-
ings on the questions of restitution and respon-
sibility for attorney fees, together with such 
additional proceedings as might be necessary 
to permit the making of adequate findings, 
where there was no record to demonstrate com-
pliance with this section State v Has-on, 811 
P.2d 929 (Utah Ct App 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds, 836 P2d 1383 (Utah 1992) 





78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boan 
inherent risks and limitations on liabilil 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent4 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks o 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch skiing and the statute of hmitations'fl^HB 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in action, was repealed by Laws 1980, c h ^ u f i H 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action o r i m 
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's feeglfllB 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense t o 3 f l 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, excHH 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees again&S 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the actSffl 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding » M 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent 
Risks of Skiing Act Avalanche from Capitol 
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev 355. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchhne in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer 





State of mind 
!, following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); MM 
stituted "shall" for "may" following ''the coarfj 
in Subsection (1), added "except under SubeeS 
e tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and addeli 
t
 Subsection (2) 
"Without merit" and "good faith" 
Cited. 
Breach of covenant of good faith by to* 
surer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not 
show the bad faith necessary for an award un-
der this section Canyon Country Store •• 
Bracey, 781 P 2d 414 (Utah 1989) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-56 
Discretion of court 
It is within the trial court's discretion to de-
termine bad faith under this section. Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1989). 
An award of attorney fees premised on a 
finding of bad faith is, to an extent, a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and ap-
pellate deference is owed to the trial judge who 
actually presided over the proceeding and has 
first-hand familiarity with the litigation. Utah 
"Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 
[(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
r Essential elements. 
This section clearly states that the court 
lihall award attorney fees to the prevailing 
r only if it determines (1) that the action is 
rithout merit and (2) that the action was 
ought in bad faith. If the court finds both 
i of the statute, then it has no discre-
i and must award reasonable attorney fees 
l the prevailing party. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
& Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
ree requirements must be met before the 
shall award attorney fees: (1) the party 
t prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the op-
party must have been without merit, 
I (3) the claim must not have been brought 
^asserted in good faith. Hermes Assocs. v. 
rtj Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct. 
1991). 
fs. 
' this section, a trial court must make 
that: (1) the claim or claims were 
at merit," and (2) the party did not act 
I faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
f section does not require written find-
i the bad faith issue. If a court finds bad 
. in its discretion limits or awards no 
\ fees, Subsection (2Kb) does, however, 
.written findings. Canyon Country 
^Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
appeal. 
eal brought from an action which is 
f determined to be in bad faith is neces-
volous under Utah R. App. P. 33. Utah 
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Hearing. 
This section does not require a trial court to 
hold a hearing to determine if a party has been 
"stubbornly litigious" or if an action was with-
out merit. Canyon County Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
State of mind. 
The existence of bad faith, which must be 
shown under this section, is a subjective ques-
tion of state of mind. Canyon County Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
"Without merit" and "good faith." 
A frivolous action having no basis in law or 
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in 
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief 
that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no 
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advan-
tage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1983). 
To prove that a claim is "without merit," the 
party asserting an award of attorney fees must 
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" 
or "of little weight or importance having no 
basis in law or fact." Second, the party must 
prove that the plaintiffs conduct in bringing 
the suit was lacking in good faith. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The "without merit" determination is a ques-
tion of law, and therefore the appellate court 
will review it for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A finding of bad faith is a question of fact 
and is reviewed by the appellate court under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 
60 (Utah 1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Cascade Energy & Metals 
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
w Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
\ Utah L. Rev. 553. 
8 Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Ac-
Utah L. Rev. 593. 
elopments in Utah Law — Legis-
lents — Attorney's Fees, 1989 
. 342. 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
New Cause of Action in Utah," 
Rev. 571. 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
state statute or rule subjecting party making 
untrue allegations or denials to payment of 
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209. 
Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud ac-
tion, 44 A.L.R.4th 776. 
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for state-
court award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Attorney's liability under state law for op-
posing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486. 
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Rule 81 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including 1 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except] 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of j _ 
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice j 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or i 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the sp 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in cor 
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of pr_ 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there ~ 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied dqesr 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
City courts. — Former § 78-4-32, as en- Cross-References. — Ad 
acted by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 1, transferred the making Act, § 63-46a-l et seq.Al 
jurisdiction and powers of the city courts to the Circuit courts generally, § 7fi 
municipal departments of the circuit courts. 
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, see 
Chapter 4, Title 78. 
Justice courts generally, §7fi 
Uniform Probate Code, Titled 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings. 
City and justices' courts. 
Criminal proceedings. 
Special statutory proceedings. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inap-
plicable to a proceeding before an administra-
tive body seeking to regulate activities bur-
dened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955). 
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor clearly 
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial 
Commission and therefore supplements the 
procedure of the Commission. Griffith v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 
(1965). 
Where road commission's order that sign be 
removed had been followed by negotiations and 
correspondence between parties as advertiser 
sought modification of order, district court had 
jurisdiction to review order in proceedings in-
stituted within thirty days of commission's def-
inite and final refusal to change its order, not-
withstanding that notice of the order had been 
given advertiser several months before. Na-
tional Adv. Co. v. Utah State Rd. Comm'n, 26 
Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971). 
Where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment 
as to the nature of the legal relationship be-
tween the No-Fault Insurance Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act and no facts 
were required to be pleaded or proved, there 
was no need to exhaust the administrative 
remedies prior to seeking a declaratory judg-
ment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 
296 (Utah 1975). 
Although the Insurance Code specifically 
outlines procedures governing appeals from 
the Insurance Commissioner's decisions, there 
is nothing therein which is inconsistent or in 
conflict with the application of t 
Civil Procedure which provide 
the time to appeal. Utah Chirop 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,! 
(Utah 1978). 
The one-month time limit forap 
mer Rule 73 applied to appeals i 
ance Commissioner's decisions 
mer Insurance Code, since 
scheme (former §§ 31-4-9 and 31-4-1 % 
provide for any limit. Utah Chirop 
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y^ 
1327 (Utah 1978). 
An appeal from the Utah 
Commission is governed by Subdiv: 
and, thus, must be made within 30 < 
Commission's notice to a litigant of j 
sion. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Ufa 
of Transp., 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1 9 ^ | 
City and justices' courts. 
Although Rule 55(a)(2) and Rule 5(ay 
that no service or notice need be i 
party in default, the time for appeal 1^  
default judgment in a city court (nowA 
court) ran from date of notice of entry < 
judgment rather than from the date i 
ment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. ' 
Utah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but t 
58A(d)). 
Criminal proceedings. 
Former §§ 77-46-1 and 77-46-2 mi 
rule and the Rules of Civil Procedure j. 
ing to discovery inapplicable to discova 
criminal cases. State v. Nielsen, 522 P.AJ 
(Utah 1974). 
Rule 52 applies to criminal actions. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Special statutory proceedings. 
An action to remove a city commissioner* 
malfeasance in office is a special statutory! 
tion to which the Rules of Civil Procedural 
1 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 85 
licable. State v Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 
p.2d 12 (1961). 
e taking of depositions pursuant to the 
Rules of Civil-Procedure is applicable in 
action to remove a public official from office 
Wlfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v. 
" 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961). 
•*e 65B(b) is "clearly inapplicable" to a pro-
• to remove a public official from office 
for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v 
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12 (1961). 
Cited in National Adv Co. v Utah State Rd. 
Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971); 
Nelson v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 
506 P.2d 437 (1973); RDG Associates/Jarman 
Corp. v Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1987); Bngham City v. Valencia, 779 
P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
— 1 C.J.S. Actions § 39. 
k
 Numbers. — Action ®=» 25(1) to 25(4), 
82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
this state or the venue of actions therein. 
er*s Notes. 
"JLC.P. 
This rule is based on 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
103. 
Young Law Review. — The Use 
X2XA) Sanction to Establish In 
Repealed. 
Rule 83, authorizing rules by 
•was repealed by order of the 
effective May 1, 1991. 
* Forms. 
contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules 
ded to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the 
plate. 
. — This rule is similar to 
• i t 
ile. 
may be known and cited as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
*U.R.C.P. 
* This rule is similar to 
Rule 43 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(e) Subsequent proceedings before Court of Appeals. Uiu 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the order of transfer and thai 
upon the docket of the Court of Appeals, the case shall pr ,_ 
Court of Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other ap 
pursuant to these rules. 
(f) Finality of order of transfer. An order of transfer, when J 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject to 
only in the Supreme Court and only on jurisdictional grour 
Advisory Committee Note. — Former 
Rules 4A and 4B have been renumbered as 
Rules 42 and 43 respectively and included in a 
new title governing the certification and trans-
fer of cases between courts, 
make uniform the practices folio 
appellate courts m transferrin*! 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exhaustion of state remedies. 
Status of Court of Appeals. 
Exhaustion of state remedies. 
Since the transfer process under this rule is 
an overflow mechanism and not a review on 
the merits as the exhaustion doctrine requires, 
petitioner's original appeal to the Utah Su-
preme Court, which was transferred to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, did not exhaust his 
state remedies. Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
Status of Court of Appeals,1* ^ 
When a case is transferred, thai 
peals stands in the Supreme 
all purposes pertinent to the caie^ 
bound by what the Supreme Court l l 
done in the case merely because it?J 
preme Court and the Court of An 
other respects, a lower court. 
Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 63i | 
App. 1987) (decided under former ] 
Utah S. Ct.). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to tn$ 
preme Court. 
(a) Transfer. In any case over which the Court of Appeals has bi; 
appellate jurisdiction, the court may, upon the affirmative vote of four jE 
of the court, certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme Coiij 
determination. 
(b) Procedure for transfer. 
(1) The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion, decide whether 1 
should be certified. Any party to a case may, however, file and ser 
original and eight copies of a suggestion for certification not exc 
five pages setting forth the reasons why the party believes that they 
should be certified. The suggestion may not be filed prior to the filii 
docketing statement. Within ten days of service, an adverse party^ 
file and serve an original and eight copies of a statement not in exc 
five pages either supporting or opposing the suggestion for certificate 
(2) Upon entry of the order of certification, the Clerk of the Cou 
Appeals shall immediately transfer the case, including the record and! 
of the case from the trial court, all papers filed in the Court of App _ 
and a written statement of all docket entries in the case up to and inch] 
ing the certification order, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The CI 
of the Court of Appeals shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk 
the trial court that the case has been transferred. 
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, the Clerk of the Suprefl 
Court shall enter the appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court, 
clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all par 
and to the clerk of the trial court that the case has been docketed and t 
all further filings will be made with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, 
notice shall state the docket number assigned to the case in the Suprefl 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 44 
Court. The case shall proceed before the Supreme Court to final decision 
and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these rules. 
(4) If the record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon comple-
tion of the conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall 
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If, 
however, the record on appeal has already been transmitted to and filed 
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of the entry of the 
order of transfer, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall transmit the 
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within five days of the 
date of the entry of the order of transfer. 
Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals shall consider certification 
in the following cases: 
N (1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that the case 
rhould be decided by the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court 
ould probably grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if 
"ded by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals 
t rule, and 
) Cases which will govern a number of other cases involving the same 
issue or issues pending in the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit 
~, or the Court of Appeals or which are cases of first impression 
state or federal law which will have wide applicability. 
•If 
*8 Notes. — The Advisory Com-
**tovRule 42 also applies to this rule. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Review. — Recent Developments 
^— The Utah Court of Appeals, 
Rev. 150. 
Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
i appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but is 
"appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the 
either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, shall 
, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders, 
e docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the 
ijfthe transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to 
teal court of the order transferring the case. The time for 
L a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
receiving court. 
; Note. — Rule 4C is Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the re-
**£$' ^  is amended to per- view of formal adjudicative proceedings. Pro-
appeal that is timely but vided that all parties have notice of the intent 
between the Supreme to seek judicial review, the same policy consid-
JJ but also to the Dis- erations that permit: the transfer of an improp-
Administrative Proce-
 e r l y f l l e d a p p e a l between the Supreme Court 
%0W has jurisdiction to
 a n d t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a i s should permit the 
.ve proceedings of ad-
 t r a n s f e r o f s u c h a c a s e to the District Court, 
oupreme Court and 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
x 
4 ,Jite, 800 P.2d 825 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Padilla v. Utah Bd. 
•^Garcia, 805 P.2d of Pardons, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991). 
Rule 22 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
not ipso facto entitle the defendant to be com-
mitted to the state hospital rather than the 
state prison. Whether defendant is entitled to 
psychiatric treatment as a i 
factual issue. State v. Ande 
(Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
committed mentally m if^j 
neuroleptic or antipsychotic C 
of state constitutional guaranty^ 
1099. - **> 
Instructions in state i 
defendant pleads insanity as tol 
fmement in event of acquittalj 
659. ^ ^ 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Convict-
ing or Confining? Alternative Directions in In-
sanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally 111 
Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Ac-
quittees, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 499. 
A.L.R. — Pyromania and the criminal law, 
51 A.L.R.4th 1243. 
Probation revocation: insanity as defense, 56 
A.L.R.4th 1178. 
Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment/^ 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no" 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not le 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the coi: 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence! 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant 
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any infot 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence! 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence^ 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his ; 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to ; 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court: & 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the coi 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which \ 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imp 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall-H 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defen 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with 1 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence impos 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi-
gation, § 76-3-404. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
Suspending imposition of sentence i 
ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 












—Presence of counsel. 
—Presence of defendant. 
—Time. 
Continuance for defendant. 
Waiver. 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant. 
Cited. 
Advising defendant of right to app 
Trial court's failure to again advisej 
dant of his right to appeal at sentencT 
harmless error where trial court had i" 
him of such right at the trial and 
verdict, and he did not object to the tin 
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 *J| 
(Utah 1982). 
Illegal sentence. 
A district court may reassume jurisdid 
correct an erroneous and void sentence 
345 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 22 
spective of the time limits State v Lee Lim, 79 
Utah 68, 7 P 2d 825 < 1932) 
Jurisdiction. 
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court 
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence 
until the sentence has been corrected; however, 
once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State 
v. Montoya, 825 P 2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
Sentences. 
—Habitual offenders. 
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine 
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordi-
nance, could not thereafter impose a jail sen-
tence under those provisions of ordinance pro-
viding for cumulative punishment for a second 
' or subsequent offense, without taking evidence 
upon the question of the previous conviction 
|Ex parte Mulhner, 101 Utah 51, 117 P 2d 819 
1(1941). 
-Indefinite suspension of sentence. 
^The court, by indefinitely suspending sen-
ence, and permitting defendant to go on his 
recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, so 
it could not afterwards have him rear-
, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah 
8, 71 P. 531, 95 Am St. R. 853 (1903) 
atencing hearing. 
ontinued hearing. 
Failure to advise accused of nature of the 
e, his plea and the verdict thereon at a 
encmg proceeding which was a continua-
ga of a pnor sentence hearing was not revers-
• where defendant was adequately ap-
[ of that information m the initial pro-
g, although it would have been prefera-
r defendant to have been advised of those 
the continued proceeding. State v. 
don, 611 P 2d 728 (Utah 1980). 
Hence. 
glinquency record. 
ord of delinquency is not admissible in | t phase of a trial even though it is rele-
t material to the issues, but the hmita-
• only to the use of the delinquency 
, evidence" and is not a bar to consid-
I the sentencing phase of a criminal 
gfe v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 
*ph examination. 
I court did not abuse its discretion in 
^consider at sentencing the results of 
h examination offered by the de-
1
 claimed that the test was perti-
Mttltimate question of his guilt, be-
J of defendant's guilt was already 
> and decided by the jury. State v 
p d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
nee report. 
^or authors of a presentence re-
quired to appear personally at a 
tttenemg. State v. Anderson, 632 
' 1981). 
counsel. 
Jttoe verdict as rendered the 
* Was mandatory, it would have 
normality to remand the case for 
^correcting error in not having 
the sentence pronounced with counsel present. 
State v Neal. 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P 2d 756 
(1953), cert, denied, 347 U S 963, 74 S Ct. 714, 
98 L. Ed 1106 (1954) 
—Presence of defendant. 
Trial court had jurisdiction over defendant 
for purposes of setting sentence although de-
fendant, while released on his own recogni-
zance, absented himself from the state, and 
was sentenced only after having been found in 
a federal correction institution in California 
some seven months after his conviction, re-
quirement that sentence be imposed within 
two to len days after the \ erdict was directory 
only, and might be extended for the conve-
nience or at the request of the defendant. State 
v Saxton. 30 Utah 2d 456, 519 P 2d 1340 
1974) 
Defendant was not required to be present at 
hearing in which his probation was continued 
State v. Jams, 597 P 2d 873 (Utah 1979) 
—Time. 
Time fixed by statute was not jurisdictional 
Rose v District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486 
(1926). 
The time fixed by the statute was not juris-
dictional and since it was regarded as merely 
directory the further provision that a judgment 
should be rendered within a reasonable time 
has been judicially read into the statute State 
v Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117. 262 P 2d 753 (1953) 
Time limits are directory, not mandatory, 
and trial court's failure to comply with them 
does not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sen-
tence; where sentence is imposed within a rea-
sonable time so that the delay does not amount 
to an abuse of the court's powers or adversely 
affect the defendant, he is not entitled to go 
free but only to have a correct sentence im-
posed, with due consideration given for any 
time vserved because of the delay. State v. 
Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977)/ 
Defendant who was convicted in March, 
1975, placed on probation in October, 1976, 
and had probation revoked and sentence im-
posed in September, 1978, was sentenced 
within reasonable time. State v Jams, 597 
P 2d 673 (Utah 1979). 
Continuance for defendant. 
Where there is a reasonable extension of 
time for sentencing made at defendant's re-
quest or with his consent or where extension 
was calculated to be for defendant's possible 
benefit in determining whether he should be 
placed on probation, failure to impose sentence 
within statutory time was not ground for de-
fendant's release. State v Helm, 563 P 2d 794 
(Utah 1977) 
Waiver. 
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing 
judgment waived the right to object Rose v 
District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486 (1926). 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant 
Requirement that defendant be asked 
whether he has any cause why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him was sub-
stantially compiled with by question as to 
whether he or his counsel had anything to 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 
may be necessary in appropnate cases to 
a client of the organization that the 
entation will not be affected by conflict-
ing loyalties of a member of the board Estab-
lished, written policies in this respect can en-
hance the credibility of such assurances 
CODE COMPARISON 
j was no counterpart to this Rule in the 
'e 6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests. 
^lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization 
Ived in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the 
may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer 
that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision 
!ch the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need 
dentify the client. 
COMMENT 
involved m organizations seeking 
orm generally do not have a chent-law-
honship with the organization Other-
might follow that a lawyer could not be 
" in a bar association law reform pro-
at might indirectly affect a client For 
>le9 a lawyer specializing m antitrust hti-
might be regarded as disqualified from 
"ting m drafting revisions of rules gov-
that subject In determining the nature 
and scope of participation in such activities, a 
lawyer should be mindful of obligations to cli-
ents under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7 
A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect 
the integrity of the program by making an ap-
propriate disclosure within the orgamzation 
when the lawyer knows a private client might 
be materially benefitted. 
CODE COMPARISON 
no counterpart to this Rule in the 
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES 
.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Ser-
i\ vices. 
er shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it: 
) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
to make the statement considered as a whole not materially 
ading; 
) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the law-
Can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results 
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or 
'Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless 
comparison can be factually substantiated. 
1131 
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COMMENT 
This Rule governs all communications about 
a lawyer's services, including advertising per-
mitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used 
to make known a lawyer's services, statements 
about them should be truthful. The prohibition 
in paragraph (b) of statements that may create 
"unjustified expectations" would ordinarily 
preclude advertisements about results ob-
tained on behalf of a client, such j 
of a damage award or the lap 
obtaining favorable verdicta, 
ments containing client endor 
information may create the 
tation that similar results can be j 
others without reference to the i 
and legal circumstances. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 2-101 provided that "[a] lawyer shall not 
. . . use . . . any form of public communication 
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, de-
ceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or 
claim." DR 2-10KB) provided that a lawyer 
"may publish or broadcast . . . the following 
information . . . in the geographic area or 
areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains 
offices or in which a significant part of the law-
yer's clientele resides, provided that the infor-
mation complies with DR 2-10KA), and is pre-
sented in a dignified manner . . . ." DR 
2-10KB) then specified twenty-fivH 
of information that may be dis 
2-10KC) provided that "[a]ny i 
to expand the information autho 
closure in DR 2-10KB), or to 
dissemination through other forumsi 
to [the agency having jurisdiction t 
law] . . . . The relief granted m*n 
any such application shall be promu 
an amendment to DR 2-10KB), uniy 
plicable to all lawyers." ,>|j 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Shapero v. 
Kentucky Bar Association and Targeted, Di-
rect-Mail Solicitation by Lawyers: How Can 
States Protect Their Residents^ 
reaching and Deceptive Solicitatio 
Utah L. Rev. 521. 
Rule 7.2. Advertising. 
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise i 
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, ne 
per or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television, or through writteB 
munication not involving solicitation as defined in Rule 7.3. ^1 
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication 
be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record o£| 
and where it was used. 
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recorrime 
the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable 
advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and maj 
the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other| 
service organization. H 
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the J 
of at least one lawyer responsible for its content. 
COMMENT 
To assist the public in obtaining legal ser- tising involves an active quest for clients, <j 
vices, lawyers should be allowed to make trary to the tradition that a lawyer «*houla 
known their services not only through reputa-
tion but also through organized information 
campaigns in the form of advertising. Adver-
seek clientele. However, the PubhV* i*« 
know about legal services can be 
part through advertising. This need is J 
1132 
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ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
rules are promulgated pursuant to the integration of the Utah State 
the Supreme Court on June 30, 1981 in In re Integration and Gover-
of the Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845 (1981), and Article VIII Section 4 of 
"tah Constitution, amended effective July 1, 1985. 
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1988 
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN 
CLIENTS, 
RULE 
4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others. 
4.2. Communication with Person Represented 
by Counsel. 
4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Person. 
4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons. 
LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS. 
5.1. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervi-
sory Lawyer. 
5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer. 
5.3. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer As-
sistants. 
5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer. 
5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
5.6. Restrictions on Right to Practice. 
PUBLIC SERVICE. 
6.1. Pro Bono Publico Service. 
6.2. Accepting Appointments. 
6.3. Membership in Legal Services Organiza-
tion. 
6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client 
Interests. 
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES. 
7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's 
Services. "' """ 
7.2. Advertising. 
7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients. 
7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice. 
7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads. 
MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE 
PROFESSION. 
8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters. 
8.2. Judicial Officials. 








"dentiality of Information. 
*ct of Interest: General Rule. 
'ct of Interest: Prohibited Transac-
*ons. 
*ct of Interest: Former Client. 
$uted Disqualification: General Rule, 
sive Government and Private Em-
"oyment. 
aer Judge or Arbitrator. 
keeping Property. 




txation for Use by Third Persons. 
~. ADVOCATE. 
*ou8 Claims and Contentions, 
/.ting Litigation. 
"'Toward the Tribunal. 
to Opposing Party and Counsel, 
lity and Decorum of the Tribunal. 
..Publicity. 
• as Witness. 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, 
te in Nonadjudicative Proceedings. 
GAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
er is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
an having special responsibility for the quality of justice, 
resentative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advi-
er provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's 
and obligations and explains their practical implications. As ad-
wyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the 
system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the 
^consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As 
between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent in-
^an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each 
955 
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client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's le 
reporting about them to the client or to others. A lawyer's ret 
client, including representation by appointment, does not coiL 
dorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral vie 
ties. 
In all professional functions, a lawyer should be competent 
diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a cliei 
the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence informat 
to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required i 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the! 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and 
fairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimat 
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demor 
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, o i _ 
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, tol 
the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold! 
cess. 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the 
ministration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the lee 
sion. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivat 
edge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in i 
the law and work to strengthen legal education A lawyer should \ 
of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that 
and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate leg 
tance and should therefore devote professional time and civic ii 
their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing 1 
tives and should help the Bar regulate itself in the public intere 
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in 
of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. HOY 
a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of j 
sional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of si 
improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal pr 
sion's ideal of public service. 
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of 
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, 
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate| 
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being doi 
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily i 
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, 
thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communicatio 
will be private. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are < 
countered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict betwe 
a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the 
own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactoi; 
living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving sue 
conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, many difficult issues of 
sional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercii 
of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principle 
underlying the Rules. 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions 
also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession i»"j 
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession ; 
and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is" 
manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is 
vested largely in the courts. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
fo the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, 
be occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps 
intain the legal profession's independence from government domination. 
„ independent legal profession is an important force in preserving govern-
ed under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a 
ofession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to 
^actice. 
[The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibili-
i of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its 
illations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of 
__chial or self-interested concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible 
»observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid 
^securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibili-
: compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest 
iich it serves. 
awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of 
role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our 
[ system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve 
Idefine that relationship. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Law Review. — Professional Stan-
Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
SCOPE 
he Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be inter-
with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law 
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall 
% These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline, 
s, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas |r the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplin-
Iction should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within 
ads of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships 
pen the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and 
plinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a law-
professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Com-
edo not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing 
apliance with the Rules. 
jjlules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That 
[ includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws 
ag specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in 
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, de-
^primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily 
einforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, 
inforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, how-
*iaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a law-
/ao worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal 
"he Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. 
ermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and re-
ality, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine 
K a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from 
'"it-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested that 
Y$t render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there 
^duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may 
JJ«en the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relation-
al be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any 
ipurpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Under various legal provisions, including constitution 
mon law, the responsibilities of government lawyers 
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the clii 
lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a gove 
have authority on behalf of the government to decide" 
whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authoS 
spects is generally vested in the attorney general and thel 
state government, and their federal counterparts, and the L__ 
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the sun 
officers may be authorized to represent several government i 
governmental legal controversies in circumstances where 
could not represent multiple private clients. They also may 1__ 
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a privat 
not be authorized to do so. These Rules do not abrogate any s 
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed j 
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presupp 
plinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the ba 
and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in* 
in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon3 
incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules pr 
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation and 1 
a sanction depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulne 
ousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether therefi 
previous violations. Disciplinary action shall be governed by the ] 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be'oiS^ 
Bar to sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincing1^ 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, nor^j 
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The'. 
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure fori 
ing conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to beS 
for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be sul 
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons, 
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanction 
lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority does not;" 
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has stand 
seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should 
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extran 
plinary consequences of violating such a duty. £ 
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial appli 
tion of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege. Those privile 
were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation?! 
reliance on the client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to exoect th 
communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected again 
compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer privilege is that of the client and n<S 
of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the 
Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate? 
the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expecta-J 
tion that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed* 
and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in, 
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and work prod-? 
uct privileges. *; 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 
1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination 
would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with 
law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclo-
sure. 
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the mean-
ing and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 
neral orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, 
the text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to 
apare counterparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility (approved by 
Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected refer-
es to other authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not constitute 
; of the Rules and are not intended to affect the application or mterpreta-
of the Rules and Comments. 
TERMINOLOGY 
3elief' or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed 
| fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circum-
aces. 
Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reason-|y sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter 
"question. 
"" i" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers 
in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and 
yers employed in a legal services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10. 
raud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and 
nerely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of rele-
*information. 
aowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in 
ion. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 
tner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law 
^organized as a professional corporation. 
sonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, 
the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer, 
aisonable belief' or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a 
• denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
stances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
[>nably should know," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that 
per of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter 
stion. 
stantial," when used in reference to degree or extent, denotes a mate-
of clear and weighty importance. 
Client-Lawyer Relationship 
•1. Competence. 
per shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
atation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and prepa-
easonably necessary for the representation. 
COMMENT 
fgal Knowledge and Skill 
lining whether a lawyer employs 
ttte knowledge and skill m a particu-
f# relevant factors include the rela-
ity and specialized nature of the 
••lawyer's general experience, the 
""lining and experience in the field in 
©preparation and study the lawyer 
[five the matter and whether it is 
•fer the matter to, or associate or 
a lawyer of established compe-
fieid in question. In many m-
L
 required proficiency is that of a 
^tioner. Expertise in a particular 
*y be required in some circum-
not necessarily have special 
training or prior experience to handle legal 
problems of a type with which the lawyer is 
unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as 
competent as a practitioner with long experi-
ence. Some important legal skills, such as the 
analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evi-
dence and legal drafting, are required m all 
legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental 
legal skill consists of determining what kind of 
legal problems a situation may involve, a skill 
that necessarily transcends any particular spe-
cialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide ade-
quate representation in a wholly novel field 
through necessary study. Competent represen-
tation can also be provided through the associ-
ation of a lawyer of established competence in 
the field in question. 
34. Approved: December 30# 1976 
Summary: It is improper for lawyers to hold themselves out as 
partners where no partnership relationship exists, 
A lawyer may not do what his partner, associate or one he shares 
office space with may not do-
An attorney may not appear before a pro-tem judge with whom 
office space is shared and may not appear in any criminal matters in 
that court. 
Pacts: Three attorneys share office space under an office 
sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm name with a single 
telephone number and address, and with the names of each of the three 
along the left margin of your letterhead. You describe the relation-
ship as "an office sharing partnership." 
Numbered among the three is a deputy county attorney who does 
criminal prosecutions and practices privately, and an attorney who 
sits periodically as municipal pro-tern judge. 
The questions you have posed are: 
1. Are the other two attorneys in the office precluded from 
doing criminal work entirely, just as to state prosecutions, just as 
to matters the deputy county attorney may be involved in, or not at 
all? 
2. What, if any, limitation should be placed on the attorney 
serving as a municipal pro tern judge, and what, if any, restrictions 
should there be as to his associates appearing before him as a pro tern 
judge or appearing before that court? 
44 
Your inquiries raise some important preliminary questions which 
must necessarily be explored prior to responding to the specific 
questions you have asked• 
You have indicated in your background information that each of 
you receives income only from your own clients and not from the work 
of any other attorney in the office* 
Opinion: Rule IV, Canon 2, DR 2-102 (C) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct indicates; 
"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a part-
nership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in 
fact partners.* 
The relationship you have delineated in your letter which you 
describe as "an office sharing partnership" is not in fact a partner-
ship but merely an office sharing arrangement• In this regard, 
several ABA Ethics Opinions are pertinent. 
Formal Opinion 106 cited with approval in the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility under DR 2-102(C) passed directly on the 
relationship, holding that it was improper for a group of attorneys to 
hold themselves out as partners where no partnership existed but one 
was the employer of the others named in the firm name. 
Formal Opinion 115 held that two attorneys could not hold them-
selves out as partners when they were, in fact, attorneys in separate 
states using a partnership name in both states and where each was 
responsible for his own office expenses. 
Formal Opinion 126 held that it was improper for lawyers sharing 
office space to hold themselves out as partners under the name A, B 
and C for the purpose of court appearances and signing pleadings when 
in fact they were not partners. Ay* 
Formal Opinion 277 held that it was improper for two attorneys in 
different cities to hold themselves out as partners under the name of 
Smith and Jonesf Attorneys at Law, when in fact what they had was a 
referral arrangement only. 
In Informal Decision 555 , the question was asked whether two 
attorneys might practice under a firm name where no real partnership 
in fact exists and when they are in reality associates sharing 
expenses. The Committee stated unequivocally: 
"This Committee has stated on numerous occasions that 
it is improper for a group of lawyers to hold themselves out 
as partners when no partnership relation in fact exists*" 
(citing the cases enumerated above) 
We think it is incumbent upon the three of you to carefully 
rethink your relationship, since it appears likely that you are 
currently at cross purposes with DR 2-102(P). 
A determination of partnership status is not, however material to 
the questions you have raised, i.e., the interrelation of you as asso-
ciates, having regard to the county prosecutor duties of one associate 
and pro-tern judge status of the other. If you were truly partners, 
you would fall under the interdiction "that which one partner could 
not do precludes all partners from undertaking to do." (ABA Formal 
Opinion 177, Informal Decisions C-493, 674, 691 and 855.) 
The question then is, are persons sharing an office relationship 
in a different position than those who are partners or associates of a 
partnership? Informal Opinion 855 holds that they are not. The 
opinion holds that: 
"• . . what a laywer cannot do, neither his partner, 
his associate nor one with whom he shares offices may do," 
This view is reinforced in Informal Opinion 995 where it is held 
cnat two lawyers who share offices, although not partners, bear such a 
close relation to one another that if one is precluded ethically from 
representing a client then so also is the other. 
With these principles as guidelines, let us examine the 
specifics. This Committee has held in Utah Opinion 26 that a pro-tern 
judge may not appear as criminal defense counsel in the same court, 
statings 
"Working with criminal court personnel and police, in 
the close circumstances required in the judicial handling of 
criminal matters, has an effect upon those persons which 
would make it difficult for a police officer, for example, 
to regard a pro-tem judge, acting as counsel, as he would 
any other lawyer ^ contending adversely to the case he is pre-
senting to the court. 
We think the appearance of impropriety and the poten-
tial for pressure on police personnel makes it inappropriate 
for an attorney serving as a pro-tern judge in city court 
criminal cases, on a not infrequent basis to also act as 
defense counsel in city court criminal cases." 
The Committee has also held in Utah Opinion 22 that county attor-
neys may not represent criminal defendants in other courts. To the 
same effect is Utah Opinion 16. This interdiction applies equally td 
a deputy. (Utah Opinions 4 and 7.) 
Neither of the remaining two could properly appear before the 
pro-tern judge since he obviously could not do so. None of you may 
appear in municipal court criminal matters since the pro-tem judge 
would be precluded. None of you could properly appear as counsel iri 
any civil matter arising out of a criminal matter in which either the 
pro-tern judge or the deputy county prosecutor had involvement*. 
It follows, of course^ that neither of the remaining two may 
represent the other side in civil litigation where one of you repre-
sents a party to the litigation. 
BY 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-16 00 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Tower Building 
P.O. Box 1425 
S t . George, Utah 84770 
T e l : (801) 628-2846 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , ; 
v s . 
SONJA SWANSON, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
gssag=ss=5BEassgs53==3===g=sss=s=sa. niaBsaassss i sssassaHsasssssssassas: 
> ORDER DENYING ATTORNEYS 
1 FEES 
i C r i m i n a l N o . 9 3 1 5 0 0 0 4 2 
asaasassaasBBSB " • SSSSSSSSB , , =s^===-- 'i ' • a 
The matter, having come before the Court on defendant's motion 
and heard on March 12, 1993, in open court at the Washington County 
Courthouse, St. George, Utah, defendant having been represented by 
her attorney of record, R. Clayton Huntsman, and the State of Utah 
by Washington County Attorney, Eric Ludlow, and the matter having 
been submitted, 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that defendant's request for 
- Suite 31 
€©PY 
1 
attorneys fees in this action be and therefore is DENIED. 
Dated this JC2=L day of March, 1993. 
WE 
¥ct Cetar;t Judge 
MAIL-ING^^ j , - . 
March^ig^ar, I mailed 
-
W
^ o ^ e g o i n g ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the // day 
a true and accurate unsigned copy of the abo^  
DENYING ATTORNEYS FEES by placing same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
^ R. cflayton/ Huntsman 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 33 —dav of March, 1993, I 
mailed a true and accurate signed copy of the above and foregoing 
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEYS FEES by placing same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
S t . George, Utah 84770 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-1600 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Tower Building 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (801) 628-2846 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





) ORDER FOR FINDING OF 
) INDIGENCY AND FOR | TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER COSTS 
Criminal No. 931500042 
Based upon its record on Friday, March 5, 1993, and upon the 
motion of defendant herein, upon applicable state and federal law 
including but not limited to U.C.A. §77-32-1 et. sea., and 
particularly under U.C.A, §77-32-5, and other good cause appearing, 
it is found, concluded and ordered that: 
1. Defendant herein is indigent and was provided the services 
of a WAshington County Public Defender through her sentencing. 
2. Defendant, being indigent and having been convicted of a 
felony in this Court, is entitled to a transcript of all 
proceedings on her case to be paid by Washington County, State of 
1 
4&*: 
- S u i t e 31 Sttev 
Utah, as well as costs of the first right of appeal, including 
appeal of the Certificate of Probable Cause if necessary. 
3. Washington County is ordered to pay the costs of this 
transcript. 
Dated this 
-A day of March, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE HAND DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that on the ^ yth day of March, 
delivered a true and accurate unsigned copy of the above and 
foregoing ORDER FINDING OF INDIGENCY AND FOR TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER 
COSTS to the following, to wit: 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
R.' CTTaytcKfi 'Hun-gsma/h 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
A£ 
I do hereby certify that on the \ Q day of March, 1993, I 
mailed a true and accurate signed copy of the above and foregoing 
ORDER FINDING OF INDIGENCY AND FOR TRANSCRIPT AND OTHER COSTS by 
placing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following, to wit: 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
2 
St, George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
3 
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